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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker (DM)’s
response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a very general decision model.
In the first part of the paper we introduce an “unambiguous preference” relation
derived from the DM’s preferences, and show that it can be represented by a set of
probability measures. We provide such set with a simple differential interpretation and
argue that it represents the DM’s perception of the “ambiguity” present in the decision
problem. Given the notion of ambiguity, we show that preferences can be represented so
as to provide an intuitive representation of ambiguity attitudes.
In the second part of the paper we provide some extensions and “applications” of these
ideas. We present an axiomatic characterization of the α-MEU decision rule. We also
consider a simple dynamic choice setting and show the characterization of the updating
rule that revises every prior in the afore-mentioned set by Bayes’s rule; i.e., the generalized
Bayesian updating rule.
JEL classification numbers: D80, D81
Key words: Ambiguity, Clarke Differentials, α-Maxmin Expected Utility, Generalized
Bayesian Updating
Ambiguity from the Differential Viewpoint∗
Paolo Ghirardato Fabio Maccheroni Massimo Marinacci
Introduction
When requested to state their maximum willingness to pay for two pairs of complemen-
tary bets involving future temperature in San Francisco and Istanbul (and identical prize
of $ 100 in case of a win) 90 pedestrians on the University of California at Berkeley
campus were on average willing to pay about $ 41 for the two bets on San Francisco tem-
perature, and $ 25 for the two bets on Istanbul temperature. That is, on average they
would have paid almost $ 16 more to bet on the (familiar) San Francisco temperature
than on the (unfamiliar) Istanbul temperature (Fox and Tversky [10, Study 4]).
This striking pattern of preferences is by no means peculiar to the inhabitants of
the Bay Area. Ever since the seminal thought experiment of Ellsberg [6], it has been
acknowledged that the awareness of missing information, “ambiguity” in Ellsberg’s ter-
minology, affects subjects’ willingness to bet. And several experimental papers, the cited
[10] being just one of the most recent ones, have found significant evidence of ambiguity
affecting decision making (see Luce [19] for a survey). Though Ellsberg emphasized the
relevance of aversion to ambiguity, later work has shown that the reaction to ambiguity
is not systematically negative. Examples have been produced in which subjects tend
to be ambiguity loving, rather than averse (e.g., Heath and Tversky [17]’s “competence
hypothesis” experiments). However, the available evidence does show unequivocally that
ambiguity matters for choice.
∗We are grateful to seminar audiences at the Universite´ Paris I, Institute for Advanced Studies (Prince-
ton, NJ), Universita` di Torino, Columbia University, as well as to Kim Border, Erio Castagnoli, Luigi
Montrucchio, Klaus Nehring and Marciano Siniscalchi for helpful comments and discussion. Maccheroni
and Marinacci are grateful to the MIUR for financial support. The authors’ e-mail addresses are respec-
tively: paolo@hss.caltech.edu; fabio.maccheroni@uni-bocconi.it; massimo@econ.unito.it.
The benchmark decision model of subjective expected utility (SEU) maximization is
not equipped to deal with this phenomenon: An agent who maximizes SEU cannot care
about ambiguity. Therefore, theory has followed experiment. Several decision models
have been proposed which extend SEU in order to allow a role for ambiguity in decision
making. Most notable are the “maxmin expected utility with multiple priors” (MEU)
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [16], which allows the agent’s beliefs to be represented by
a set of probabilities, and the “Choquet expected utility” (CEU) model of Schmeidler [26],
which allows the agent’s beliefs to be represented by a unique but nonadditive probability.
These models have been employed with success in understanding and predicting behavior
in activities as diverse as investment (e.g., Epstein andWang [8]), labor search (Nishimura
and Ozaki [24]) or voting (Ghirardato and Katz [12]).
The objective of this paper is to show how to model formally ambiguity, and a decision
maker (DM)’s response to it, in the context of a general decision model (that, for instance,
encompasses MEU and CEU). It is an objective that, as discussed below, in our view has
not been fully achieved by the previous literature. The intuition behind our approach
can be explained in the context of the “3-color” experiment of Ellsberg. Suppose that a
DM is faced with an urn containing 90 balls which are either red, blue or yellow. The
DM is told that exactly 30 of the balls are red. If we offer him the choice between a bet
r that pays $ 10 if a red ball is extracted, and the bet b that pays $ 10 if a blue ball is
extracted, he may display the preference
r  b.
On the other hand, let y denote the bet that pays $ 10 if a yellow ball is extracted, and
suppose that we offer him the choice between the “mixed” act (1/2)r+(1/2)y (that yields
half the utility of $ 10 if a blue ball is not extracted) and the “mixed” act (1/2)b+(1/2)y
(that yields half the utility of $ 10 if a red ball is not extracted). Then, we might observe
1
2
r +
1
2
y ≺ 1
2
b+
1
2
y,
a violation of the independence axiom (Anscombe and Aumann [1]). The well-known
rationale is the following: the bet y allows the DM to “hedge” the ambiguity connected
with the bet b, but not that connected with r. The DM responds to the ambiguity
he perceives in this decision problem by opting for the “ambiguity hedged” positions
represented by the acts r and (1/2)b + (1/2)y. Needless to say, we could observe a DM
who displays exactly opposite preferences: she prefers b to r and (1/2)r + (1/2)y to
(1/2)b + (1/2)y because she likes to “speculate” on the ambiguity she perceives, rather
than to hedge against it.
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In both cases, the presence of ambiguity in the decision problem a DM is facing is
revealed to an external observer (who may ignore the information that was given to him
about the urn composition) in the form of violations of the independence axiom. By
comparison, consider a DM who does not violate independence when comparing an act
f with an act g. That is, f < g and for every act h and weight λ,
λf + (1− λ)h < λg + (1− λ)h. (1)
This DM does not appear to find any possibility of hedging against or speculating on the
ambiguity of the problem at hand. We therefore conclude that such ambiguity does not
affect the comparison of f and g. Differently put, the DM “unambiguously prefers” f to
g, which we denote by f∪< g.
In the first part of the paper (Sections 1–4), we consider a preference < that satisfies
a weak set of axioms, and show that its unambiguous preference relation ∪< (which
is clearly incomplete) can be represented by a set C of probabilities on the state space
S. We argue that such set is a representation of the DM’s perception of the ambiguity
connected to the problem at hand. We do so by invoking concepts from differential
calculus, explaining the title of this paper. Next, we show that once ambiguity has thus
been isolated, ambiguity attitude can be easily represented formally. This formalization
clarifies that the decision model we use is compatible with any type of ambiguity attitude,
and is therefore consistent with the rich spectrum of reactions to ambiguity observed in
experimental work. The next subsection provides a more detailed overview of these
results.
In the second part of the paper (Sections 5–8), we provide some extensions and
“applications” of the concepts developed in the first part. In particular, we present an
axiomatic characterization of a decision rule akin to Hurwicz’s α-pessimism rule, known
in the literature as the “α-MEU” decision rule. We also look at a simple dynamic choice
setting and show the characterization of the updating rule that revises every prior in the
set C by Bayes’s rule, the so-called “generalized Bayesian updating” rule. An overview
of this part is presented in the subsection on “Extensions” below.
The Perception of Ambiguity and Differentials
Using the traditional setting of Anscombe and Aumann [1], we consider an arbitrary state
space S and a convex set of outcomes X.1 We assume that the DM’s preference < satisfies
1Therefore, an “act” is a map f : S → X assigning an outcome f(s) ∈ X to every state s ∈ S. A
“mixed” act λf + (1− λ)h assigns to s the outcome λf(s) + (1− λ)h(s) ∈ X.
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a subset of the axioms that characterize Gilboa and Schmeidler [16]’s MEU model. In
particular, we do not impose a key axiom that entails a preference for ambiguity hedging
(the one they call “uncertainty aversion”), thus obtaining a less restrictive model than
MEU. For instance, every preference that satisfies the CEU model satisfies our axioms,
while those that satisfy MEU are a strict subclass.
Given such <, we derive from it the unambiguous preference relation ∪< in the
manner described by Eq. (1), and show that ∪< has a simple “unanimity” representation
in the style of Bewley [3]: there is a utility u on X and a set of probabilities C (nonempty,
closed and convex) on S such that
f∪< g if and only if
∫
S
u(f(s)) dP (s) ≥
∫
S
u(g(s)) dP (s) for all P ∈ C.
That is, the DM deems f to be unambiguously better than g whenever the expected utility
of f is higher than the expected utility of g in every probabilistic scenario that the DM
considers possible. The set C thus obtained represents, as we shall argue presently, the
DM’s revealed “perception of ambiguity”. We use the term “perception” as a reminder
to the reader that no objective meaning is attached to C.2 That is, nothing precludes two
DMs from perceiving different ambiguity in the same decision problem.
It follows from our definition of unambiguous preference that if the DM does not
ever violate the independence axiom, by definition we attribute to him no perception
of ambiguity. Indeed, then C = {P} for some probability P : the DM behaves as if he
considers only one scenario P to be possible, maximizing his subjective expected utility
with respect to such P . Of course, the DM may just not be reacting to the ambiguity he
perceives. However, the (standard) assumption that the only general observable is the
DM’s preference over mixed acts does not allow to distinguish between these situations.
Ancillary information (e.g., what the DM knows about the decision problem) is needed.
We offer a few reasons why the set C may be interpreted as a representation of the
DM’s ambiguity perception. Foremost among these reasons is the following. It is simple
to see that if a DM’s preference < has a SEU representation, the DM’s probabilistic
beliefs P correspond to the derivative (in the sense of Gaˆteaux) of the functional I
that represents his preferences.3 Intuitively, the probability P (s) is the shadow price for
(ceteris paribus) changes in the DM’s utility in state s. In other words, in the case of
a DM who satisfies SEU, we can learn the DM’s understanding of the stochastic nature
2We do not carry around the adjective “revealed”. It should be obvious that, since we only use
behavioral data, all the aspects of our mathematical representation are revealed (or better, attributed).
3That is, I such that f < g if and only if I(u(f)) ≥ I(u(g)).
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of his decision problem — the collection of all the possible probabilistic scenarios — by
calculating the derivative of his preference functional.
If < does not have a SEU representation, but satisfies our axioms, the functional
I that represents < is not necessarily Gaˆteaux differentiable. However, it does have a
generalized set-valued derivative. It is the notion of “Clarke differential”, developed by
Clarke [5] as an extension of the concept of superdifferential (e.g., Rockafellar [25]) to
functionals that do not satisfy concavity. It is natural to maintain that the generalization
of the previous remark should hold in this case: the Clarke differential describes the DM’s
understanding of the collection of all possible probabilistic scenarios (more than one, in
this case). Our most important result shows that, as required, the set C obtained as the
representation of ∪< is the Clarke differential of I.
Interestingly, when the DM’s preference functional I is concave — that is, when his <
satisfies MEU— the Clarke differential corresponds to the superdifferential, and the set C
is then equal to the set of priors that Gilboa and Schmeidler derive in their representation
[16]. Therefore, the set of priors in MEU represents perceived ambiguity as defined in
this paper.
Armed with the notion of perceived ambiguity, we turn to the issue of formally de-
scribing the DM’s reaction to the presence of ambiguity. In our main representation
theorem, we show that it is possible to express the DM’s preference functional I so as
to associate to each act f an ambiguity aversion coefficient a(f) between 0 and 1. A
surprising feature of the ambiguity aversion function a(·) is that it displays significantly
less variation than we might expect it to. For instance, the DM must have identical
ambiguity attitude for acts that agree on their ranking of the possible scenarios in C.
This restriction does not constrain overall ambiguity attitude that, as mentioned earlier,
can still range from strong attraction to strong aversion.
In this representation, a MEU preference with set of priors C is more ambiguity averse
(in the relative sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci [15]) than any other preference with
identical set of possible scenarios. That is, contrary to what is sometimes believed, MEU
preferences do represent extreme aversion to ambiguity, a conclusion that could not be
drawn without the separate derivation of perceived ambiguity obtained here.
Besides the mentioned conceptual interest, the differential characterization of the set
C is also useful from a purely operational standpoint. By giving access to the large
literature on the Clarke differential, it provides a different route to calculate and verify
properties of the perceived ambiguity of the DM. For instance, when the state space S
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is finite, the set C can be calculated using an explicit formula for the Clarke differential
found in Clarke [5].
Extensions
We begin the second part of the paper by considering the consequences of our theory of
ambiguity for the classification of events and acts into “ambiguous” and “unambiguous”.
As should be expected, unambiguous events are the ones whose probability is identical in
all possible scenarios, and the collection of unambiguous events is a λ-system. Moreover,
for a significant subclass of preferences, such collection coincides with that, easily identi-
fiable, suggested by Ghirardato and Marinacci [15]. As to acts, we call unambiguous any
act which is measurable with respect to unambiguous events, and show how unambiguous
acts can be characterized in terms of the set C of possible scenarios.
Next, we study the interesting special case of our decision model in which the ambigu-
ity aversion function a(·) is constantly equal to α ∈ [0, 1]. That is, we discuss preferences
which evaluate every act according to the rule
αmin
P∈C
∫
S
u(·) dP + (1− α)max
P∈C
∫
S
u(·) dP,
commonly known as the “α-maxmin expected utility” (α-MEU) rule. We show that
α-MEU preferences can be characterized by an axiom that requires that the DM be
indifferent between acts which induce the same interval of expected utilities (as we range
over the possible scenarios in C).
Finally, we consider a simple dynamic extension of our decision model, and look at
the behavior of ambiguity perception as we vary the DM’s information as to which event
in S obtains. We require preferences conditional on event A to depend only on acts’
behavior on A (an assumption usually dubbed “consequentialism”), and observe that
while dynamic consistency of the primitive conditional preference relations may be unduly
restrictive in a setting with ambiguity, the same property appears to be more compelling
when imposed just on the derived unambiguous preference relations. Interestingly, we
find that this weaker dynamic consistency requirement is equivalent to the generalized
Bayesian updating rule. We also show that the notion of “rectangularity” introduced by
Epstein and Schneider [7] can be given an analogous characterization in the more general
decision model we employ.
6
Discussion
It is perhaps useful to mention from the outset some limitations and peculiarities of
our analysis and terminology. We follow the traditional decision-theoretic practice of
assuming that only the decision problem (states, outcomes and acts) and the DM’s
preference over acts are observable to an external observer (e.g., the modeller). We
do not assume that any other ancillary information will in general be available to the
external observer. Hence, we do not use such information in our analysis.
This premise entails a number of limitations in the accuracy of the terminology we
use. First, as observed earlier, we may attributing no perception of ambiguity to a DM
who is aware of ambiguity but disregards it. As we are ultimately interested in modelling
the ambiguity that is reflected in behavior, we do not believe this to be a serious problem.
Second, and more important, we attribute every departure from the independence
axiom to the presence of ambiguity. That is, following Ghirardato and Marinacci [15]
we implicitly assume that behavior in the absence of ambiguity will be consistent with
the SEU model. However, it is well-known that observed behavior in the absence of
ambiguity — that is, in experiments with “objective” probabilities — is often at spite
with the independence axiom (again, see Luce [19] for a survey). As a result, the relation
∪< we attribute to a DM displaying such systematic violations overestimates the DM’s
perception of ambiguity. His set C describes behavioral traits that are not related to
ambiguity per se.
As extensively discussed in [15], this overestimation of the role of ambiguity could be
avoided by careful filtering of the effects of the behavioral traits unrelated to ambiguity.
But such filtering requires an external device (e.g., a rich set of events) whose unambiguity
is primitively assumed, in violation of our observability premise. For conceptual reasons
outlined in [15], in the absence of such device we prefer to attribute all departures from
independence to the presence of ambiguity. However, the reader may prefer to use a
different name for what we call “perception of ambiguity”. We hope that it will be
deemed to be an object of interest regardless of its name.
An aspect of our analysis which may appear to be a limitation is our heavy reliance
on the concept of mixed acts. Indeed, the existence of a mixture operation is key to
identifying the unambiguous preference relation. As the traditional interpretation of
mixtures in the Anscombe-Aumann [1] framework is in terms of “lotteries over acts”, it
may be believed that our model also relies on an external notion of ambiguity. However,
this is not the case, for it has been shown by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and
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Siniscalchi [13] that, if the set of outcomes is sufficiently rich, for any mixture of acts it
is possible to construct an act whose state-contingent utility profile replicates perfectly
that of the mixture. Our analysis can be fully reformulated in terms of such “subjective
mixtures”, and hence requires no external device.
The Related Literature
In addition to the mentioned paper of Gilboa and Schmeidler [16], there are a number of
papers that share features, objectives, or methods with this paper.
Our approach to modelling ambiguity is closely related to that of Klaus Nehring. In
particular, Nehring was the first to suggest using the maximal independent restriction of
the primitive preference relation, which turns out to be equivalent to our ∪< , to model
the ambiguity that a DM perceives in a problem. He spelled out this proposal in an
unpublished conference presentation of 1996, in which he also presented the character-
ization of the set C representing ambiguity perception for MEU and CEU preferences
when the state space is finite and utility is linear.4
In the recent [23], Nehring develops some of the ideas of the 1996 talk. The first part
of that paper moves in a different direction than this paper, as it employs an incomplete
relation that reflects probabilistic information exogenously available to the DM. The
second part is closer to our work. In a setting with infinite states and consequences,
Nehring defines a DM’s perception of ambiguity by the maximal independent restriction
of the primitive preferences over bets. He characterizes such definition and shows that
under certain conditions it is equivalent to the one discussed here and in his 1996 talk (see
footnote 8 below). His analysis mainly differs from ours in two respects. The first is that
his preferences induce an underlying set C satisfying a range convexity property. The
second is that he also investigates preferences that do not satisfy an assumption that he
calls “tradeoff consistency”, that the preferences discussed here satisfy automatically. A
consequence of the range convexity of C is that CEU preferences can only satisfy tradeoff
consistency if they maximize SEU, a remarkable result that does not generalize to the
preferences we study (whose C is not necessarily convex-ranged).
A final major difference between Nehring’s mentioned contributions and the present
paper is that he does not envision any differential interpretation for the set of probabilities
that represents the DM’s ambiguity perception. To the best of our knowledge, the only
4“Preference and Belief without the Independence Axiom”, presented at the LOFT2 conference in
Torino (Italy), December 1996. (The slides are available from the author upon request.)
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papers to use differential techniques to study ambiguity averse preferences are the recent
Carlier and Dana [4] and Marinacci and Montrucchio [21]. Both papers focus on Choquet
preference functionals, and they look at the Gaˆteaux derivatives of Choquet integrals as
a device for characterizing the core of such capacities [21], or for obtaining a more direct
computation of Choquet integrals in optimization problems [4].
In terms of the representation of preferences, this paper is quite close to a recent work
of Siniscalchi [29]. He considers a special case of the preference model we employ, showing
that the representation of these preferences can be decomposed in a fashion which also
involves a set of probabilities. Both the decomposition and the set of probabilities are in
general different from the ones obtained in this paper. On the other hand, he does not
explicitly focus on the distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude.
We next review papers that propose behavioral notions of unambiguous events or
acts, but do not address the distinction between ambiguity and the DM’s reaction to it
(Section 5 contains some additional discussion). It is important to underscore an impor-
tant difference between our “relation-based” approach at modelling ambiguity and the
“event-based” approach of these papers. Suppose that f and g are ambiguous acts such
that f dominates g statewise. Then we do obtain the conclusion that f is unambigu-
ously preferred to g, but the “event-based” papers do not. That is, there are aspects of
ambiguity that a “relation-based” theory can describe, but the “event-based” theories
cannot. We are not aware of any instance in which the converse is true.
Epstein and Zhang [9] propose a behavioral notion of unambiguous event, and char-
acterize a family of preferences whose behavior is “probabilistically sophisticated” on the
acts measurable with respect to the set of unambiguous events. Their notion of unam-
biguous event is different to the one we present. For instance, all events are unambiguous
in the Epstein-Zhang sense when the DM has a CEU preference whose capacity is a trans-
formation of a probability measure. This is not necessarily the case with our definition.
(The discussion in Ghirardato and Marinacci [15] explains why this is consistent with
our choice of attributing violations of independence to ambiguity.)
In another offshoot of the mentioned 1996 talk, Nehring [22] looks at CEU prefer-
ences in a finite states setting and proposes a notion of unambiguous events for CEU
preferences equivalent to the notion we proposed (that he also obtains for a different
class of preferences in Nehring [23]). He then shows some interesting results on its char-
acterization. Such notion is different to the one, also for CEU preferences, proposed and
discussed by Zhang [30].
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Kopylov [18] proposes a notion of unambiguity for acts (that he calls “transparency”)
equivalent to our notion of crispness. Given the preference ordering over those acts,
he considers the set M of all the probabilities that represent that ordering, and he
characterizes the MEU preferences whose set of priors coincides with M. Outside the
MEU model, the set M he suggests will in general be different from our C.
As to the papers that discuss ambiguity aversion, the closest to our work is Ghirardato
and Marinacci [15]. That paper also suggests a notion of ambiguity for acts and events
that only applies to a subset of preferences, and is more permissive than the one proposed
here. They do not obtain a separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, but we
show that once that separation is achieved by the technique we propose, their notion of
ambiguity attitude is consistent with ours. In light of this, we refer the reader to the
introduction of [15] for discussion of the relation of what we do with other works that
address the characterization of ambiguity attitude.
Outline of the Paper
As explained earlier, the paper is roughly divided into two parts. The first part presents
the basic ideas and fundamental results of our approach. After introducing some basic
notation and terminology in Section 1, we present the basic axiomatic model in Section 2.
Section 3 is the decision-theoretic core of the paper. It discusses the unambiguous pref-
erence relation, its characterization by a set of possible scenarios, and closes with the
general represenation theorem with the characterization of ambiguity attitude. The dif-
ferential interpretation of the set of possible scenarios and related results are presented
in Section 4.
The second part of the paper starts with the discussion, in Section 5, of the notions of
unambiguous event and act that follow from our perspective on ambiguity. In Section 6,
we derive from unambiguous preference two additional concepts that are (natural and)
useful for the ensuing discussion. The characterization of α-MEU is presented in Sec-
tion 7. The discussion of the dynamic extension of the model, with the characterizations
of generalized Bayesian updating and rectangularity, is found in the closing Section 8
The paper has three appendices. Appendix A presents some results which are em-
ployed in almost every other argument, along with further technical detail on Clarke
differentials and their properties. Appendix B contains all the proofs of the results in the
main body of the paper, in order of appearance. Appendix C shows how to extend the
analysis of the first part of the paper to infinitely-valued acts.
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1 Preliminaries and Notation
Consider a set S of states of the world, an algebra Σ of subsets of S called events, and
a set X of consequences. We denote by F the set of all the simple acts: finite-valued
Σ-measurable functions f : S → X. Given any x ∈ X, we abuse notation by denoting
x ∈ F the constant act such that x(s) = x for all s ∈ S, thus identifying X with the
subset of the constant acts in F. Given f, g ∈ F and A ∈ Σ, we denote by f A g the act
in F which yields f(s) for s ∈ A and g(s) for s ∈ Ac ≡ S \ A.
For convenience (see the discussion in the next section), we also assume that X is
a convex subset of a vector space. For instance, this is the case if X is the set of all
the lotteries on a set of prizes, as it happens in the classical setting of Anscombe and
Aumann [1]. In view of the vector structure of X, for every f, g ∈ F and λ ∈ [0, 1] as
usual we denote by λf + (1− λ)g the act in F which yields λf(s) + (1− λ)g(s) ∈ X for
every s ∈ S. When convenient, we use f λ g as a short-hand for λf + (1− λ)g.
We model the DM’s preferences on F by a binary relation <. As usual,  and ∼
denote respectively the asymmetric and symmetric parts of <.
We let B0(Σ) denote the set of all real-valued Σ-measurable simple functions, or
equivalently the vector space generated by the indicator functions 1A of the events A ∈
Σ. If f ∈ F and u : X → R, we denote by u(f) the element of B0(Σ) defined by
u(f) (s) = u(f(s)) for all s ∈ S. We denote by ba(Σ) the set of all finitely additive and
bounded set-functions on Σ. If ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) and m ∈ ba(Σ), we write indifferently
∫
ϕdm
or m(ϕ). Elements of ba(Σ) which are probabilities are typically denoted with P and Q.
Given a functional I : B0(Σ) → R, we say that I is: monotonic if I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ) for
all ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ) such that ϕ(s) ≥ ψ(s) for all s ∈ S; constant additive if I(ϕ + a) =
I(ϕ) + a for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) and a ∈ R; positively homogeneous if I(aϕ) = aI(ϕ)
for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) and a ≥ 0; constant linear if it is constant additive and positively
homogeneous.
2 Invariant Biseparable Preferences
In this section, we introduce the basic preference model that is needed for our later
results, which is a generalization of the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [16].
Axiom 1 (Weak Order) (a) For all f, g ∈ F, f < g or g < f . (b) If f, g, h ∈ F, f < g
and g < h, then f < h.
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Axiom 2 (Certainty Independence) If f, g ∈ F, x ∈ X, and λ ∈ (0, 1], then
f < g ⇐⇒ λf + (1− λ)x < λg + (1− λ)x.
Axiom 3 (Archimedean Axiom) If f, g, h ∈ F, f  g, and g  h, then there exist
λ, µ ∈ (0, 1) such that
λf + (1− λ)h  g and g  µf + (1− µ)h.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity) If f, g ∈ F and f(s) < g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f < g.
Axiom 5 (Non-degeneracy) There are f, g ∈ F such that f  g.
The following representation result is easily proved by mimicking the arguments of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [16, Lemmas 3.1–3.3] (cf. Ghirardato et al. [13, Theorem 5]).
Lemma 1 A binary relation < on F satisfies axioms 1–5 if and only if there exists a
monotonic, constant linear functional I : B0(Σ) → R and a nonconstant affine function
u : X → R such that
f < g ⇐⇒ I(u(f)) ≥ I(u(g)) (2)
Moreover, I is unique and u unique up to a positive affine transformation.
This representation is less structured than the MEU representation eventually ob-
tained by Gilboa and Schmeidler. They assume that the preference relation satisfy an
additional axiom that we call ambiguity hedging:5 (1/2)f +(1/2)g < g for all f, g ∈ F
such that f ∼ g. This allows them to prove that the functional I in the lemma is concave.
They then show that in such case the functional I can be represented as the minimum
expected utility with respect to a set of probabilities D on Σ, so that the DM chooses
according to a “maxmin expected utility” rule. As we shall explain in more detail below,
we refer to such preferences as 1-MEU (rather than just MEU, as we have done so far)
preferences. It is natural to interpret the probabilities in D as a reflection of the ambigu-
ity that the DM perceives in the decision problem, but a problem with such interpretation
is the fact that the set D appears in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s analysis only as a result
of the assumption of ambiguity hedging. It therefore seems that the DM’s perception of
ambiguity cannot be disentangled from his behavioral response to such ambiguity.
5Gilboa and Schmeidler call this property “uncertainty aversion”. See Ghirardato and Marinacci [15]
for an explanation of our departure from that terminology.
12
In the next section, we show that it is possible to separate the revealed perception
of ambiguity from the DM’s reaction to its presence. For that reason, it is important
to notice here that axioms 1–5 do not build in any specific reaction to ambiguity (as
ambiguity hedging does), a point that will be expounded in greater detail below.
We call a preference < satisfying axioms 1–5 an invariant biseparable preference.
The adjective biseparable (originating from Ghirardato and Marinacci [15, 14]) is due to
the fact that the representation on binary acts of such preferences satisfies the following
separability condition (for a proof see [13, Proposition 14]): Let ρ : Σ→ R be defined by
ρ(A) ≡ I(1A). Then, ρ is a normalized and monotone set-function (a capacity) and for
all x, y ∈ X such that x < y and all A ∈ Σ,
I(u(xAy)) = u(x) ρ(A) + u(y) (1− ρ(A)). (3)
We call ρ a representation the DM’s willingness to bet on events. The adjective
invariant refers to the fact that the preferences satisfying axioms 1–5, differently from
those discussed in general in [14], are represented by a unique functional I.
As indicated above, 1-MEU preferences (and hence SEU preferences) constitute a
subclass of invariant biseparable preferences. Another significant subclass is that of CEU
preferences, due to Schmeidler [26], which correspond to the special case in which the
functional I is the Choquet integral with respect to the willingness to bet ρ. A well-known
result of Schmeidler [26, Proposition] shows that the CEU preferences whose willingness
to bet ρ is supermodular characterize the intersection of the CEU and 1-MEU classes.6
We refer the reader to [14] for additional examples of invariant biseparable preferences.
We reiterate that the choice to retain the classical Anscombe-Aumann setting used by
Gilboa and Schmeidler is motivated only by the intention of putting our contribution in
sharper focus. Ghirardato et al. [13] show that if the set X does not have an “objective”
vector structure (i.e., it is not convex) but is sufficiently rich, it is still possible to define
mixtures in a subjective yet operationally well-defined sense. They use these “subjective
mixtures” to provide an axiomatization of invariant biseparable preferences in a fully
subjective setting, and they could be similarly used to extend the analysis in this paper.
Unless otherwise indicated, for the remainder of this paper < is tacitly assumed to
be an invariant biseparable preference (i.e., to satisfy axioms 1–5), and I and u are the
constant linear functional and utility index that represent < in the sense of Lemma 1.
6A capacity ρ is supermodular if ρ(A ∪B) ≥ ρ(A) + ρ(B)− ρ(A ∩B) for every A,B ∈ Σ.
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3 Priors, Perceived Ambiguity, and Ambiguity Atti-
tude
3.1 Unambiguous Preference
As we explained in the introduction, our point of departure is a relation on F derived
from < that says that hedging/speculation considerations do not affect the ranking of
acts f and g. (Notice that this relation is defined for any binary relation < on F, not
only those satisfying axioms 1–5.)
Definition 2 Let f, g ∈ F. Then, f is unambiguously preferred to g, denoted f∪< g,
if
λf + (1− λ)h < λg + (1− λ)h
for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and all h ∈ F.
The unambiguous preference relation is clearly incomplete in most cases. We collect
some of its other properties in the following result.
Proposition 3 The following statements hold:
1. If f∪< g then f < g.
2. For every x, y ∈ X, x∪< y iff x < y. In particular, ∪< is nontrivial.
3. ∪< is a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive).
4. ∪< is monotonic: if f(s) < g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f∪< g.
5. ∪< satisfies independence: for all f, g, h ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1],
f∪< g =⇒ λf + (1− λ)h∪< λg + (1− λ)h.
6. ∪< satisfies the sure-thing principle: for all f, g, h, h′ ∈ F and A ∈ Σ,
f Ah∪< g Ah⇐⇒ f Ah′∪< g Ah′.
7. ∪< is the maximal restriction of < satisfying independence.7
7That is, if ∪<′ ⊆ < and ∪<′ satisfies independence then ∪<′ ⊆ ∪< .
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Thus, unambiguous preference satisfies both the classical independence conditions. It
is a refinement of the state-wise dominance relation and the maximal restriction of the
primitive preference relation satisfying independence.
The last point of the proposition shows that if we turned our perspective around
and defined unambiguous preference as the maximal restriction of < that satisfies the
independence axiom, we would find exactly our ∪< . As mentioned earlier, this second
approach was suggested by Nehring in a 1996 talk (see footnote 4).8 While eventually the
approaches reach the same conclusions, we prefer the approach taken in this paper as it
is directly linked to more basic behavioral considerations about hedging and speculation.
3.2 The Perception of Ambiguity
We now show that the unambiguous preference relation ∪< can be represented by a set
of probabilities, thus extending to an infinite state space a result of Bewley [3]. (An
alternative generalization is found in Nehring [23].)
Proposition 4 There exists a unique nonempty, weak* compact and convex set C of
probabilities on Σ such that for all f, g ∈ F,
f∪< g ⇐⇒
∫
S
u(f) dP ≥
∫
S
u(g) dP for all P ∈ C. (4)
In words, f is unambiguously preferred to g if and only if every probability P ∈ C assigns
a higher expected utility to f in terms of the function u obtained in Lemma 1. It is
natural to interpret each prior P ∈ C as a “possible scenario” that the DM envisions,
so that unambiguous preference corresponds to preference in every scenario. Given an
act f ∈ F, we will refer to the mapping {P (u(f)) : P ∈ C} that associates to every
probability P ∈ C the expected utility of f as the expected utility mapping of f (on
C).
Since C is a set of probabilities, it is natural to interpret it as a representation of
the ambiguity the DM sees in the decision problem. In Section 4 we provide further
argument in favor of this interpretation by showing the differential nature of C. Here we
offer a couple of additional remarks in support of this interpretation.
8 Nehring [23] independently introduces ∪< and observes, in a setting with infinite states, its equiv-
alence to the approach taken in 1996 talk. He also provides further motivation for his approach.
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Consider two DMs with respective preference relations <1 and <2 (whose derived
relations are subscripted accordingly). Given our interpretation of ∪< , it is natural to
posit that if one DM has a richer unambiguous preference, it is because he feels better
informed about the decision problem. Formally, <1 perceives more ambiguity than
<2 if for all f, g ∈ F:
f∪<1 g =⇒ f∪<2 g.
That is, ∪<1 ⊆ ∪<2 . It turns out that this comparative definition of perceived ambiguity
is equivalent to the inclusion of the sets of priors C:
Proposition 5 Given invariant biseparable preferences <1 and <2, the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) <1 perceives more ambiguity than <2.
(ii) u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2 and C1 ⊇ C2.
As a consequence, the size of the set C measures the DM’s perception of ambiguity. The
larger C is, the more ambiguity the DM appears to perceive in the decision problem.
When does a DM behave as if he does not perceive any ambiguity in the decision
problem he is facing? Intuitively, it is when his unambiguous preference relation ∪<
coincides with his preference relation <. This is clearly tantamount to saying that <
is itself independent. More importantly for our interpretation of the set C, it is also
equivalent to saying that there is only one possible scenario:
Proposition 6 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) <= ∪< .
(ii) < is independent.
(iii) C = {P}.
(iv) < has a SEU representation with probability P .
Summarizing the results obtained so far, we have shown that C represents what we
call the (subjective) perception of ambiguity of the DM, and we have concluded that
the DM perceives some ambiguity in a decision problem if C is not a singleton. Notice
that this characterization of perceived ambiguity has not relied on any assumption on the
DM’s reaction to his perception of ambiguity. We now turn our attention to the latter,
which is the force that drives the relation between the expected utility mapping and the
DM’s evaluation of an act.
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3.3 Enter Ambiguity Attitude: The Representation
We begin our discussion of ambiguity attitude with the following observation.
Proposition 7 Let I and u be respectively the functional and utility obtained in Lemma 1,
and C the set obtained in Proposition 4. Then
min
P∈C
P (u(f)) ≤ I(u(f)) ≤ max
P∈C
P (u(f)). (5)
That is, the functionals on F defined by minP∈C P (u(·)) and maxP∈C P (u(·)) — that
respectively correspond to the “worst-” and “best-case” scenario evaluations within the
set C— provide bounds to the DM’s evaluation of every act. We now use this sandwiching
property to show how the functional I can be decomposed so as to obtain a formal
description of the ambiguity attitude of the DM.
It is first of all important to illustrate how the perception of ambiguity already par-
titions F into sets of acts with “similar ambiguity”. The following relation on the set F
is key: For any f, g ∈ F, write f  g if there exist a pair of consequences x, x′ ∈ X and
weights λ, λ′ ∈ (0, 1] such that
λ f + (1− λ)x∪∼ λ′ g + (1− λ′)x′, (6)
where ∪∼ denotes the symmetric component of the unambiguous preference relation.
The next result characterizes the relation  in terms of the expected utility mappings of
the acts.
Lemma 8 For every f, g ∈ F, the following statements are equivalent:9
(i) f  g.
(ii) The expected utility mappings {P (u(f)) : P ∈ C} and {P (u(g)) : P ∈ C} are a
positive affine transformation of each other: there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that
P (u(f)) = αP (u(g)) + β for all P ∈ C.
(iii) The expected utility mappings {P (u(f)) : P ∈ C} and {P (u(g)) : P ∈ C} are
isotonic: for all P,Q ∈ C,
P (u(f)) ≥ Q(u(f))⇐⇒ P (u(g)) ≥ Q(u(g)).
9As inspection of the proof quickly reveals, the result is true under the assumption that there exist a
function u and a set C that represent ∪< in the sense of Eq. (4), without any additional conditions on
the primitive <.
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Statement (ii) implies that  is an equivalence. Statement (iii) of the lemma is very
helpful in interpreting . Two functions on a set are isotonic if they order its elements
identically. Therefore, f  g is tantamount to saying that f and g order possible scenarios
identically: the best scenario for f is best for g, the worst for g is worst for f , etc. From
the vantage point of the DM’s perception of ambiguity, the dependence of f and g on
the existing ambiguity is the same.
Since  is an equivalence, it is natural to inquire about the structure of its equivalence
classes. Given f ∈ F, denote by [f ] the equivalence class of  that contains f and by
F/ the quotient of F with respect to ; i.e., the collection of all the equivalence classes.
Clearly, [f ] contains all acts that are unambiguously indifferent to f (take λ = 1 in
Eq. (6)), but it may contain many more acts. Analogously, it follows immediately from
the lemma above that all constants are -equivalent; that is, for all x, y ∈ X, we have
y ∈ [x]. However, the class [x] contains also acts which are not constants.
The following behavioral property of acts, which is inspired by a property that Kopy-
lov [18] calls “transparency” (as his terminology suggests, he interprets it differently from
us), is key in understanding the structure of [x].
Definition 9 The act k ∈ F is called crisp if for all f, g ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1),
f ∼ g =⇒ λ f + (1− λ) k ∼ λ g + (1− λ) k.
That is, an act is crisp if it cannot be used for hedging other acts. Intuitively, this
suggests that its evaluation is not affected by the ambiguity the DM perceives in the
decision problem. The following characterization validates this intuition:
Proposition 10 For every k ∈ F, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) k is crisp.
(ii) k  x for some x ∈ X.
(iii) For every P,Q ∈ C, ∫ u(k) dP = ∫ u(k) dQ.
(iv) For every f ∈ F and λ ∈ [0, 1],
I[u(λ k + (1− λ) f)] = λ I(u(k)) + (1− λ) I(u(f)).
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Statement (ii) shows that [x], the equivalence class of the constants, is the collection of
all the crisp acts. Moreover, notice that it follows from statement (iv) of this proposition
and (ii) of Proposition 6 that if every act is crisp, the DM perceives no ambiguity (i.e.,
he satisfies SEU).
We are now ready to formulate our main representation theorem, wherein we achieve
the formal separation of perceived ambiguity and the DM’s reaction to it. Interestingly,
it turns out to be a generalized Hurwicz α-pessimism representation (see footnote 13
below) in which the set of priors is generated endogenously.
Theorem 11 Let < be a binary relation on F. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) < satisfies axioms 1–5.
(ii) There exist a nonempty, weak∗ compact and convex set C of probabilities on Σ and
a nonconstant affine function u : X → R that represent the induced ∪< in the
sense of Eq. (4). There exists a function a : (F/ \ {[x]}) → [0, 1] such that < is
represented by the monotonic functional I : B0(Σ)→ R defined by
I(u(f)) =
{
a([f ])minP∈C
∫
u(f) dP + (1− a([f ]))maxP∈C
∫
u(f) dP if f 6∈ [x]∫
u(f) dP for some P ∈ C if f ∈ [x].
Moreover, C is unique, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and a is unique
if C is not a singleton.
In other words, the theorem proves that the functional I derived in Lemma 1, when
restricted to noncrisp acts, has the form:
I(u(f)) = a([f ])min
P∈C
∫
S
u(f) dP + (1− a([f ]))max
P∈C
∫
S
u(f) dP. (7)
Clearly, the 1-MEU preference model and more generally the α-MEU preference model
(that we characterize axiomatically in Section 7) in which a is a constant α ∈ [0, 1] are
special cases of the representation above. Also, observe that when C = {P} every act is
crisp. Hence, the function a disappears from the representation, which reduces to SEU.
To understand this representation, it is important to observe that for any f ∈ F \ [x],
the coefficient a([f ]) only depends on the expected utility mapping {P (u(f)) : P ∈ C} of
f on C. As a result, the same is true of DM’s evaluation I(u(f)) of any act f ∈ F: The
profile of expected utilities of f (as a function over C) determines the DM’s preference.
This is a key feature of our representation, which is also enjoyed by the model studied by
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Siniscalchi in [29]. Moreover, if f and g are noncrisp acts and f  g, then a([f ]) = a([g]):
The DM’s reaction to the ambiguity of f is identical to his reaction to the ambiguity of
g.
It is intuitive to interpret the function a as an index of the ambiguity aversion of the
DM: The larger a([f ]), the bigger the weight the DM gives to the “pessimistic” evaluation
of f given by minP∈C P (u(f)). The following simple result verifies this intuition in terms
of the relative ambiguity aversion ranking of Ghirardato and Marinacci [15]. In our
setting, the latter is formulated as follows: <1 is more ambiguity averse than <2 if for all
f ∈ F and all x ∈ X, x <2 f ⇒ x <1 f ; equivalently, for all f and x, f <1 x⇒ f <2 x.
Proposition 12 Let <1 and <2 be invariant biseparable preferences, and suppose that
<1 and <2 perceive identical ambiguity. Then, <1 is more ambiguity averse than <2 if
and only if a1([f ]) ≥ a2([f ]) for every f ∈ F \ [x].
(Recall from Proposition 5 that <1 and <2 perceive identical ambiguity if and only if
C1 = C2 and u1 and u2 are equivalent.) We conclude that the function a is a complete
description of the DM’s ambiguity attitude in relation to the perception of ambiguity
described by C.
In closing this section, we observe that it follows from Proposition 12 that there are
always DMs which are more and less ambiguity averse than the DM whose preference
is <. In fact, the best- and worst-case scenario evaluations define invariant biseparable
preferences that satisfy these conditions, since they correspond to a(·) constantly equal
to 0 and 1 respectively. In a sense, they describe the DM’s “ambiguity averse side” and
his “ambiguity loving side”. However, notice that these DMs do not necessarily satisfy
the SEU model, so they may not make the preference ambiguity averse in the sense of
Ghirardato and Marinacci [15].
4 Perceived Ambiguity is a Differential
In this section we go back to the functional I on B0(Σ) derived in Lemma 1 and we
show that the set C corresponds to the Clarke differential of the functional I at 0. As
remarked earlier, this offers further backing to our interpretation of C, while at the same
time yielding a separate, operational, route for constructing a preference’s set of possible
scenarios.
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Recalling our steps in the introduction, we start by assuming that the DM’s prefer-
ences satisfy axioms 1–5 plus ambiguity neutrality: for all f, g ∈ F such that f ∼ g,
(1/2)f + (1/2)g ∼ g. Then, the functional I is monotonic and linear, so that there is a
probability P on Σ such that I(u(f)) = P (u(f)); i.e., the DM satisfies the SEU model.
Such functional has Gaˆteaux derivative constant and equal to P . The DM’s beliefs can
therefore be found by calculating the Gaˆteaux derivative of his preference functional in
any point ϕ ∈ B0(Σ), for instance ϕ ≡ 0.
Suppose instead that the DM’s preferences satisfy axioms 1–5 plus ambiguity hedging,
as described after Lemma 1. Then, the functional I is monotonic, constant linear and
concave, and as proved by Gilboa and Schmeidler [16] it can be represented by maxmin
expected utility over a set of priors D. In this case I is not necessarily Gaˆteaux dif-
ferentiable. However, it does everywhere have directional derivatives and a nonempty
superdifferential, as defined below (see, e.g., Rockafellar [25]).
Definition 13 Given a concave functional I : B0(Σ)→ R, its directional derivative
in ϕ in the direction ξ is defined by
dI(ϕ; ξ) ≡ lim
t↓0
I(ϕ+ tξ)− I(ϕ)
t
.
The superdifferential of I at ϕ is the set of linear functionals that dominate the direc-
tional derivative dI(ϕ; ·). That is,
∂I(ϕ) ≡ {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(ξ) ≥ dI(ϕ; ξ), ∀ξ ∈ B0(Σ)}.
For a concave and constant linear I we have the following generalization of the character-
ization of I’s derivative: the set D of priors is equal to the superdifferential ∂I(0). Thus,
the set of priors corresponds with the set of the possible supergradients of I at 0. The
SEU case corresponds to the special case in which ∂I(0) = {P}, for the superdifferential
of I coincides with its Gaˆteaux derivative when the latter exists.
Turn to preferences that only satisfy axioms 1–5. Now the functional I is only mono-
tonic and constant linear, so that the existence of right-hand derivatives and superdiffer-
entials is not guaranteed. However, I is shown to be Lipschitz (hence supnorm continu-
ous). For such functionals it is customary in the literature on nonsmooth optimization
to use the following generalized notions due to Clarke [5]. (See Appendix A for further
details.)
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Definition 14 Given a Lipschitz functional I : B0(Σ) → R, its Clarke (lower)
derivative in ϕ in the direction ξ is defined by
I◦(ϕ; ξ) =lim inf
ψ→ϕ
t↓0
I(ψ + tξ)− I(ψ)
t
.
The Clarke differential of I in ϕ is the set of linear functionals that dominate the
Clarke derivative I◦(ϕ; ·). That is,
∂I(ϕ) = {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(ξ) ≥ I◦(ϕ; ξ), ∀ξ ∈ B0(Σ)}.
It can be shown (Prop. 45 in App. A) that Clarke derivatives and differentials exist for
every Lipschitz functional, and that if I is also concave, the Clarke differential coincides
with the superdifferential. This justifies our usage of the same symbol to denote both
sets. Moreover, when I is monotone and constant linear, its Clarke differential is a set of
probability charges; that is, all the L ∈ ∂I(ϕ) are normalized and positive (Prop. 47 in
App. A).
The following result shows that the set C of the possible scenarios that we derived in
the previous section corresponds to the Clarke differential of I in 0.
Theorem 15 Let < be a binary relation satisfying axioms 1–5, and I and C respectively
the functional and set of probabilities presented in Theorem 11. Then
C = ∂I(0).
Thus, the differential characterization of “beliefs” for this class of preferences applies
to the set of possible scenarios, providing further validation to our interpretation of C
as a set of possible beliefs. Clearly, this calculus characterization is useful in providing
an operational method for assessing a DM’s perception of ambiguity C, based on the
computation of the Clarke differential at 0. However, it proves enlightening also for
purely theoretical reasons.
For instance, from the mentioned equivalence of the Clarke differential and the su-
perdifferential for concave I it immediately follows that C = D whenever < satisfies
ambiguity hedging. In other words, for a 1-MEU preference the set of priors corresponds
to the set of possible scenarios. We thus generalize a result that was proved for finite S by
Nehring, as reported in his 1996 talk (see footnote 4, and cf. his alternative generalization
in [23]).
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More interestingly, we can use the differential characterization to draw some conclu-
sions on the relation between the comparatively based notion of ambiguity aversion of
Ghirardato and Marinacci [15] and the ideas in this paper. Begin by considering the
following two subsets of SEU preferences.
Definition 16 Given a functional I : B0(Σ)→ R, the core of I is the set
Core(I) ≡ {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(ξ) ≥ I(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ B0(Σ)}.
The anti-core of I is the set
Anticore(I) ≡ {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(ξ) ≤ I(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ B0(Σ)}.
As our choice of terminology suggests,10 when I is a Choquet integral with respect to a
capacity ρ (so that it is constant linear), we have [15, Corollary 13] that
Core(I) = Core(ρ) and Anticore(I) = Anticore(ρ).
However, these notions apply also to preferences which are not CEU. Indeed, if < is
a 1-MEU preference, then [15, Corollary 14] Core(I) = D. Clearly, both Core(I) and
Anticore(I) could be empty, and they are simultaneously nonempty if and only if I is
linear.
The elements of Core(I) (resp. Anticore(I)) correspond to SEU preferences > which
are less (resp. more) ambiguity averse than < in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci
[15]: for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X, x > f ⇒ x < f (resp. x < f ⇒ x > f). We now show
that they correspond to some possible scenario.
Proposition 17 Let I be a monotonic, constant linear functional. Then
Core(I) ∪ Anticore(I) ⊆ ∂I(0).
Moreover, Core(I) = ∂I(0) if and only if I is concave, while Anticore(I) = ∂I(0) if and
only if I is convex.
The second statement shows that Core(I) contains all the possible scenarios if and only
if I is concave; that is, < is a 1-MEU preference with set of priors D = Core(I).
It follows from the proposition that while Ghirardato and Marinacci’s “benchmark
measures” of < (the elements of Core(I)) are all possible scenarios, they exhaust the
10In Ghirardato and Marinacci [15] these sets are denoted D(<) and E(<) respectively.
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set C only when < is a 1-MEU preference. In particular, the DM may not have any
benchmark and yet be quite ambiguity averse, in the sense of having a uniformly high
(but not constantly 1) ambiguity aversion coefficient. On the other hand, if he does have
a benchmark measure, then he cannot be too ambiguity loving (say, have a([f ]) ≤ 1/2
for every f ∈ F \ [x], with strict inequality for one f) except in the trivial case in which
he satisfies SEU.
As an operational consequence of the Clarke differential characterization, consider
the special case in which the state space S is finite, S = {s1, s2, ..., sn}. Then, the Clarke
differential can be given a more elementary representation, as it is related to the collection
of the standard gradients of I (see Thm. 49 in App. A).
This representation becomes even simpler in the case in which I is a Choquet integral
with respect to its willingness to bet ρ. If σ is a permutation of {1, 2, ..., n}, let
P σ(sσ(i)) = ρ({sσ(1), sσ(2), ..., sσ(i)})− ρ({sσ(1), sσ(2), ..., sσ(i−1)})
and notice that P σ is a probability on S. Now, recall the following property of Choquet
integrals. If ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) is such that ϕ(sσ(1)) ≥ ϕ(sσ(2)) ≥ · · · ≥ ϕ(sσ(n)), then
I(ϕ) =
∫
S
ϕdρ =
∫
S
ϕdP σ.
That is, the Choquet integral of a function that orders the states consistently with the
permutation σ is equal to a standard integral with respect to P σ.
The finite representation of C mentioned above implies that the set C is the convex
hull of the set of all the P σ; i.e., the convex hull generated by the probabilities used in
calculating the Choquet integral as we vary the monotonicity of the act being evaluated.
We thus generalize a result obtained, for the case of linear utility, by Nehring in a 1996
talk (see footnote 4).
Corollary 18 Let I be a Choquet integral and S = {s1, s2, ..., sn}. Then
C = co{P σ : σ ∈ Per(n)}
where Per(n) is the set of all the permutations of {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Specialize further to the case in which I is concave; i.e., it is a Choquet integral with
respect to a supermodular ρ. Then it follows from Proposition 17 that C = Core(ρ). We
can thus use the corollary to obtain as a consequence of our main result the well-known
characterization of the core of a supermodular capacity due to Shapley [27].
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5 Ambiguity of Events and Acts
5.1 Unambiguous Events
We have earlier introduced crisp acts, those whose evaluation is not affected by the
ambiguity the DM perceives in a problem. Consider in particular crisp bets ; i.e., acts
of the form xAy for x  y. We suggest that the event corresponding to a crisp bet be
defined unambiguous (Nehring [23] proposes an equivalent definition, and shows that the
latter is in turn equivalent to one he earlier studied in [22]):
Definition 19 An event A ∈ Σ is unambiguous if for some x  y, the act xAy is
crisp. The collection of all the unambiguous events is denoted by Λ.
The next result shows that unambiguous events have a simple and intuitive characteriza-
tion in terms of the probabilities in C, and that if xAy is crisp for some x  y then x′Ay′
is crisp for every x′  y′. This conforms with our intuition that ambiguity is property of
events (more accurately, event partitions), not acts.
Proposition 20 For any A ∈ Σ, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) A is unambiguous.
(ii) P (A) = Q(A) for all P,Q ∈ C.
(iii) For every x  y, the act xAy is crisp.
For all invariant biseparable preferences, the collection Λ has a simple and intuitive
structure (cf. Zhang [30] and Nehring [22]).
Proposition 21 Λ is a (finite) λ-system. That is: 1) S ∈ Λ; 2) if A ∈ Λ then Ac ∈ Λ;
3) if A,B ∈ Λ and A ∩B = ∅ then A ∪B ∈ Λ.
Nehring [22] shows that, if S is finite and I is a Choquet integral (so that the charac-
terization of C given in Corollary 18 holds), the set Λ can be further characterized as
follows:
Λ = {A ∈ Σ : ρ(B) = ρ(B ∩ A) + ρ(B ∩ Ac) for all B ∈ Σ}.
It follows that in this special case Λ is an algebra, a result that shows that Choquet
preferences cannot be used to model some potentially interesting ambiguity situations
(see for instance the 4-color example in Zhang [30]).
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Ghirardato and Marinacci [15] propose a behavioral notion of unambiguous event for
a subclass of invariant biseparable preferences, showing that it has a simple characteri-
zation terms of the willingness to bet set-function ρ defined in Section 2: an event B is
unambiguous in their sense if and only if ρ(B) + ρ(Bc) = 1. The definition given above
enjoys two main advantages over this earlier proposal: it is more general, applying to any
invariant biseparable preference, and, more importantly, it is more accurate, as it allows
to distinguish between events which are truly (perceived) unambiguous and those that
appear to be because of the behavior of the DM’s ambiguity attitude.
To understand the second point, recall the ambiguity aversion index a of Theorem 11,
and notice that if x  y and x′  y′, then xB y  x′B y′. Hence, we can define, with a
slight abuse of notation,
a([B]) ≡ a([xB y]),
if x  y. The coefficient a([B]) is interpreted as the ambiguity aversion that the DM
reveals when betting on the ambiguous event B. Using this coefficient, it is easy to see
that the willingness to bet set-function ρ can be written as follows: for all B ∈ Σ \ Λ,
ρ(B) = a([B])min
P∈C
P (B) + (1− a([B]))max
P∈C
P (B).
(Clearly, for B ∈ Λ, ρ(B) = minP∈C P (B) = maxP∈C P (B).) The following general result
holds:
Proposition 22 For all B ∈ Σ, ρ(B) + ρ(Bc) = 1 if and only if either B ∈ Λ or
B ∈ Σ \ Λ and a([B]) + a([Bc]) = 1. In particular, if < is an α-MEU preference with
α 6= 1/2, then B ∈ Λ if and only if ρ(B) + ρ(Bc) = 1.
Thus, the fact that ρ(B) + ρ(Bc) = 1 allows us to conclude that either the event B
is unambiguous, or the DM’s ambiguity attitude when betting on or against B exactly
compensate (notice that when a(·) ≡ 1/2, ρ(B) + ρ(Bc) = 1 for every B ∈ Σ). Nehring
[23] presents an example in which the latter phenomenon obtains, so that complement
additivity of ρ holds also for events which are not unambiguous.
While the proposition illustrates how to easily construct such examples, it suggests
that they will be quite uncommon. In fact, in addition to the case of α-MEU preferences
with α 6= 1/2 mentioned in the proposition, it is easy to think of general preference models
for which a([B]) + a([Bc]) 6= 1 for every ambiguous B.11 For instance, consider DMs who
11It is not hard to verify that the condition a([B]) + a([Bc]) 6= 1 (that, recall, is defined only for
B ∈ Σ \ Λ) is equivalent to the following behavioral condition: for some x  y,
1
2
c(xB y) +
1
2
c(y B x) 
1
2
x+
1
2
y,
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are consistently ambiguity averse (resp. loving) in the sense of having a([f ]) > 1/2 (resp.
a([f ]) < 1/2)) for all the f ∈ F\ [x] (of which 1-MEU and its symmetric opposite 0-MEU
are clearly special cases). For all such preferences, finding the events over which ρ is
complement additive provides a convenient way of identifying the set Λ.
5.2 Unambiguous Acts
In view of the fact that Λ is a λ-system, it is natural to call “unambiguous” the acts
whose upper level sets are unambiguous events (cf., e.g., Epstein and Zhang [9]).
Definition 23 Act f ∈ F is unambiguous if its upper sets {s ∈ S : f(s) < x} belong
to Λ for all x ∈ X. The set of all the unambiguous acts is denoted U.
Some simple properties of unambiguous acts follow.
Proposition 24 For any f ∈ F, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is unambiguous.
(ii) {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ a} ∈ Λ for all a ∈ R.
(iii) {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = a} ∈ Λ for all a ∈ R.
(iv) {s ∈ S : f(s) ∼ x} ∈ Λ for all x ∈ X.
(v) There exist a partition {A1, A2, ..., An} of S in Λ and x1  x2  ...  xn in X such
that f is pointwise indifferent to {x1, A1;x2, A2; ...;xn, An}.
An obvious question to ask at this point is whether crisp acts are unambiguous. It
follows from Proposition 20 (iii) that every binary crisp act is unambiguous. However,
the following example shows that this fact does not generalize to acts which pay more
than two nonindifferent prizes.
Example 25 Let S = {s1, s2, s3}, and consider the set C generated by the priors P =
[1/3, 1/4, 5/12] and Q = [1/4, 5/12, 1/3]. Clearly the set Λ = {∅, S}, so that only the
constants belong to U. Consider now an act f = {x, {s1}; y, {s2}; z, {s3}} such that
u(x) = 1, u(y) = 4, u(z) = 7. Immediate calculation yields∫
u(f) dP = 51/12 =
∫
u(f) dQ. (8)
Thus f is crisp.
where for any f ∈ F we denote by c(f) an arbitrary certainty equivalent of f .
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The problem with act f in the example is that Eq. (8) holds because of the specific
identity of P and Q, rather than the fact that f is “unambiguous” in any intuitive
sense. A simple way to raise a doubt about f ’s lack of ambiguity is to observe that
the act g = {y, {s1}; z, {s2};x, {s3}} that “permutes” payoffs, while being measurable
with respect to the same partition as f , does not satisfy the analogue of Eq. (8). This
conflicts with the mentioned intuition that ambiguity is a property of the event partition
with respect to which an act is measurable.
Indeed, it turns out that the unambiguous acts are basically those acts whose crispness
is not affected by permuting payoffs.
Proposition 26 Let f = {xi;Ai}ni=1, with x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ X and {A1, A2, ..., An} a par-
tition of S in Σ. If for each permutation σ of {1, 2, . . . , n} the act fσ = {xσ(i);Ai}ni=1 is
crisp, then f is unambiguous. The converse is true whenever xi  xj for every i 6= j in
{1, . . . , n}.
Notice that a binary act xB y satisfies the permutation crispness condition if and only
if B is unambiguous. The non-indifference condition in the converse is the reason of the
qualifier “basically” above. To see why permutation crispness may fail for unambiguous
acts with indifferent outcomes, consider the following:
Example 27 Let S = {s1, s2, s3}, and consider the set C generated by the two probabil-
ities P = [1/3, 2/3, 0] and Q = [1/3, 0, 2/3]. Clearly the set Λ = {∅, {s1}, {s2, s3}, S}.
Consider now an act f = {x, {s1}; y, {s2}; z, {s3}} such that u(x) = 1, u(y) = u(z) =
0. By definition f is unambiguous, but when we consider the (permuted) act fσ =
{y, {s1};x, {s2}; z, {s3}}, we have∫
u(fσ) dP = 2/3 > 0 =
∫
u(fσ) dQ.
However, it is still possible to use the proposition to obtain a full characterization
of the relation between crisp and unambiguous acts. In fact, it can be shown that for
any unambiguous f with some indifferent payoffs, there is an act f ′ with non-indifferent
payoffs which is state-wise indifferent to f , whose permutations all have constant expected
utility over the set C.
6 Some Additional Derived Concepts
We now introduce some additional concepts derived from the unambiguous preference
relation, which, besides being intrinsically interesting, are useful in the following devel-
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opments of the ideas in the first part of the paper.
6.1 Mixture Certainty Equivalents
For any act f ∈ F, we can denote by C(f) the set of the (standard) certainty equivalents
of f . That is,
C(f) = {x ∈ X : x ∼ f}.
In our setting C(f) 6= ∅ for every f ∈ F.
However, there is another notion of certainty equivalent that arises naturally in this
context, linked to the relation ∪< . Denote by N(f) the set of the consequences that are
“indifferent” to f in the following sense:
N(f) ≡ {x ∈ X : for all y ∈ X, y∪< f implies y∪< x, f∪< y implies x∪< y}.
Intuitively, these are the constants that correspond to possible certainty equivalents of
f . (Recall that x∪< y if and only if x < y.)
The following result provides the characterization of N(f) in terms of the expected
utilities mapping on C:
Proposition 28 For every f ∈ F,
x ∈ N(f)⇐⇒ min
P∈C
P (u(f)) ≤ u(x) ≤ max
P∈C
P (u(f)).
Moreover, u(N(f)) = [minP∈C P (u(f)), maxP∈C P (u(f))].
It follows immediately from the proposition that x ∈ N(f) if and only if there is a P ∈ C
such that u(x) = P (u(f)). That is, u(N(f)) is the range of the expected utility mapping
of f : the collection of the possible expected utilities of f corresponding to the scenarios
in C.
It is simple to convince oneself that N(f) ⊇ C(f). This is not surprising, since N(f)
corresponds to one possible way of defining the “certainty equivalents” of f according
to the incomplete relation ∪< , while C(f) is the set of the certainty equivalents of f
according to its completion <.
There is another, behaviorally more interesting, way to see that the elements of N(f)
are generalized certainty equivalents of f . Consider a consequence x ∈ X that can be
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substituted to f as a “payoff” in a given mixture. That is, such that for some λ ∈ (0, 1]
and h ∈ F,
xλh ∼ f λ h.
The following result shows that, while not all the elements of the set N(f) can in general
be expressed in this fashion, each of them is infinitesimally close (in terms of preference)
to a consequence with this property.12
Proposition 29 For every f ∈ F, N(f) is the preference closure of the set
{x ∈ X : ∃λ ∈ (0, 1], ∃h ∈ F such that xλh ∼ f λ h}.
In light of this result, we abuse terminology somewhat and call x ∈ N(f) a mixture
certainty equivalent of f , and N(f) the mixture certainty equivalents set of f .
6.2 Lower and Upper Envelope Preferences
Given the unambiguous preference ∪< induced by <, we can also define the following
two relations:
Definition 30 The lower envelope preference is the binary relation <↓ on F defined
as follows: for all f, g ∈ F,
f <↓ g ⇐⇒ {x ∈ X : f∪< x} ⊇ {x ∈ X : g∪< x}.
The upper envelope preference is the binary relation <↑ on F defined as follows: for
all f, g ∈ F,
f <↑ g ⇐⇒ {x ∈ X : x∪< f} ⊆ {x ∈ X : x∪< g}.
The relation <↓ describes a “pessimistic” evaluation rule, while <↑ an “optimistic” eval-
uation rule. To see this, notice that <↓ ranks acts by the size of the set of consequences
that are unambiguously worse than f . In fact, it ranks f exactly as the most valuable
consequence that is unambiguously worse than f . The twin relation <↑ does the opposite.
We denote by ↓ and ∼↓ (resp. ↑ and ∼↑) the asymmetric and symmetric component
of <↓ (resp. <↑) respectively.
This is further clarified by the following result, which shows that the envelope relations
can be represented in terms of the set C derived in the previous section. Given a Lipschitz
12In the statement by “preference closure” of a subset Y ⊆ X, we mean u−1
(
u(Y )
)
.
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functional I : B0(Σ), call its Clarke (upper) derivative in ϕ in the direction ξ the
functional
I◦(ϕ; ξ) =lim sup
ψ→ϕ
t↓0
I(ψ + tξ)− I(ψ)
t
.
Proposition 31 For every f, g ∈ F, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) f <↓ g (resp. f <↑ g).
(ii) minP∈C P (u(f)) ≥ minP∈C P (u(g)) (resp. maxP∈C P (u(f)) ≥ maxP∈C P (u(g))).
(iii) I◦(0;u(f)) ≥ I◦(0;u(g)) (resp. I◦(0;u(f)) ≥ I◦(0;u(g))).
It follows from this result that <↓ is a 1-MEU preference (i.e., it satisfies ambiguity
hedging alongside axioms 1–5). Moreover, while for every x, y ∈ X, x < y if and only
if x <↓ y, <=<↓ holds if and only if < is 1-MEU, so that < and <↓ will be in general
distinct. Symmetric observations hold for <↑.
The relations between <↓, <↑ and < can be better understood by recalling the relative
ambiguity aversion ranking of Ghirardato and Marinacci [15].
Proposition 32 The preference relation <↓ is more ambiguity averse than <, which is
in turn more ambiguity averse than <↑.
Therefore, the envelope relations (and the respective Clarke derivatives) can be inter-
preted as the “ambiguity averse side” and the “ambiguity loving side” of the DM. Indeed,
<↓ is ambiguity averse in the absolute sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci [15], while <↑
is ambiguity loving.
7 An Axiomatization of α-MEU Preferences
The general characterization of Theorem 11 suggests an interesting type of invariant
biseparable preferences: those whose ambiguity aversion index a is constant. The next
axiom characterizes this class of preferences.
Axiom 6 For every f, g ∈ F, N(f) = N(g) implies f ∼ g.
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The interpretation of the axiom is straightforward. For a DM who satisfies axiom 6, the
mixture certainty equivalents set of an act contains all the information the DM uses in
evaluating it, the specific mapping from states to payoffs does not matter.
Notice that the condition N(f) = N(g) in the axiom could also be rewritten as
follows: for every x ∈ X, f∪< x if and only if g∪< x, and x∪< f if and only if x∪< g
(using the unambiguous preference relation), or f ∼↓ g and f ∼↑ g (using the envelope
preference relations).
In terms of the representation in Eq. (7), axiom 6 guarantees that the DM’s evaluation
I(u(f)) of act f depends only on the range [minP∈C P (u(f)),maxP∈C P (u(f))] of the
expected utility mapping {P (u(f)) : P ∈ C}, rather than on the expected utility mapping
itself. More surprisingly, such dependence must be linear.
Theorem 33 Let < be a binary relation on F. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) < satisfies axioms 1–6.
(ii) There exist a nonempty, weak∗ compact and convex set C of probabilities on Σ and a
nonconstant affine function u : X → R that represent the induced ∪< in the sense
of Eq. (4). There exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that < is represented by the preference
functional I : B0(Σ)→ R defined by
I(u(f)) = αmin
P∈C
∫
S
u(f) dP + (1− α)max
P∈C
∫
S
u(f) dP.
Moreover, C is unique, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and α is unique
if C is not a singleton.
To understand why this result is true, notice that if the evaluation only depends on
the range [minP∈C P (u(f)),maxP∈C P (u(f))], the same is true of the ambiguity aversion
coefficient a([f ]). But we observed earlier that a([f ]) is unaffected by positive affine
transformations of (the utility profile of) f . Given any two acts f, g ∈ F, there is always
a positive affine transformation of g which has the same pair of minima and maxima of
f , so that a([f ]) = a([g]).
This theorem provides a simple axiomatic characterization of the well-known “α-
pessimism” model of Hurwicz, where the set of priors is derived endogenously, and is not
exogenously fixed to be the set of all the priors on S. We do not know of any previous
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axiomatization of this preference rule where the DM’s perception of the ambiguity in the
problem is endogenously derived.13
We call any preference with a representation as in statement (ii) of the theorem (or
equivalently, satisfying axioms 1–6) an α-MEU preference.
7.1 (β,D)-MEU Preferences and Uniqueness
We have interpreted the coefficient α in the representation in Theorem 33 as a coefficient
of the DM’s aversion to perceived ambiguity. For this interpretation to make sense, the
uniqueness of α, which follows from that of C as a representation of the relation ∪<
(except in the SEU case), is crucial. That is, the coefficient α is indeed well-defined as
an index of aversion to the ambiguity described by C.
However, this does not rule out the possibility that the preference < may have a
similar representation with a different coefficient and a different set of priors. To better
understand this point, consider the following definition:
Definition 34 A binary relation < which is represented by the functional
f 7→ βmin
Q∈D
∫
S
u(f) dQ+ (1− β)max
Q∈D
∫
S
u(f) dQ
for some nonconstant affine function u on X, nonempty, weak∗ compact and convex set
D of probabilities on Σ and β ∈ [0, 1] is called a (β,D)-MEU preference.
Given any nonconstant affine u, it can be seen (Lemma 54 in Appendix B) that a prefer-
ence represented by a functional I is a (β,D)-MEU preference if and only if there exists
a set D of probabilities such that
min
P∈D
P (ψ) ≤ I(ψ) ≤ max
P∈D
P (ψ)
for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ) and I(ψ) only depends on [minP∈D P (ψ),maxP∈D P (ψ)]. For instance,
similar preferences could be observed when the set D corresponds to some objective
probabilistic information available to the DM (cf. also Nehring [23]).
In general, it is possible that the same preference be represented by different pairs
(β1,D1), (β2,D2). The preferences satisfying axioms 1–6 are no exception, as the follow-
ing example illustrates:
13The original axiomatization of Hurwicz (which apparently delivered the constant α representation)
has never been published. What has been is a weaker choice-theoretic axiomatization, developed with
Arrow [2], in which the pessimism index is a function of the worst and best outcome of the act.
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Example 35 Given an arbitrary set of states (S,Σ) and X = [0, 100], let D = {P :
P = λQ+ (1− λ)Q′,∃λ ∈ [0, 1]}, with Q and Q′ two distinct probabilities. Consider the
(1/2,D)-MEU preference < defined by
f < g ⇐⇒ 1
2
min
P∈D
P (f) +
1
2
max
P∈D
P (f) ≥ 1
2
min
P∈D
P (g) +
1
2
max
P∈D
P (g).
It is easy to convince oneself that < also has the SEU representation
f < g ⇐⇒
∫
S
f d(
1
2
Q+
1
2
Q′) ≥
∫
S
g d(
1
2
Q+
1
2
Q′),
so that it is invariant biseparable and satisfies axiom 6. Hence < has a representation with
set of priors D and ambiguity aversion parameter 1/2, and another one with the singleton
set {(1/2)Q + (1/2)Q′}, which is also the set that represents ∪< (the corresponding
coefficient α is arbitrarily defined, of course).
The preference in the example can be represented as (β,D)-MEU in two (indeed, infinitely
many) different ways.14 However, consistently with the espoused view that we expect the
DM to satisfy independence in the absence of ambiguity, we find the SEU representation
more compelling. Why say that the DM perceives ambiguity when he behaves as if he
does not?
In the example C ⊆ D. This is not a coincidence. As the next result shows, the set C
is contained in every D that represents a (β,D)-MEU preference.
Proposition 36 Let < be a (β,D)-MEU preference. Then < satisfies axioms 1–5 and
D ⊇ C. If, moreover, < satisfies axiom 6 and perceives some ambiguity, then α ≥ β if
β > 1/2 and α ≤ β if β < 1/2.
To understand the second statement, notice that when we use D ⊃ C we are (as in the
example above) attributing to the DM an inflated perception of ambiguity. We are thus
underestimating the magnitude of his reaction to the perceived ambiguity.
Notice that it is always possible to verify whether we are using the correct represen-
tation of perceived ambiguity. In fact, it is easy to verify that if D ⊃ C, then there is
some act f ∈ F such that the evaluations given by x ∼↓ f and x ∼↑ f do not coincide
with the ones obtained using the representation D.
14The specific example is chosen for expositional convenience. Nothing in it is knife-edge. In particular,
it is not crucial to have that β = 1/2 and that the preference is SEU.
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On the other hand, we observed in Section 4 that Theorem 15 implies that D = C if
β = 1 (or β = 0). Thus, the uniqueness of the representation of perceived ambiguity is
not at issue whenever we observe a DM with an ambiguity aversion coefficient of 0 or 1.
For this reason, our reference to such preferences simply as 0- and 1-MEU is warranted.
8 Perceived Ambiguity and Updating
We now consider a simple dynamic extension of our static decision problem. Suppose
that our DM has an information structure given by some subclass Π of Σ (say, a partition
or a sub-algebra), and assume that we can observe our DM’s ex ante preference on F,
denoted interchangeably < or <S, and his preference on F after having been informed
that an event A ∈ Π obtained, denoted <A. For each A ∈ Π′ ≡ Π ∪ S, the preference
<A is assumed to be invariant biseparable, and the utility representing <A is denoted by
uA. Clearly, a conditional preference <A also induces an unambiguous preference relation∪<A , as well as mixture certainty equivalents sets NA(·) and a lower envelope preference
relation <↓A. Because <A is invariant biseparable, it is possible to represent ∪<A in the
sense of Proposition 4 by a nonempty, weak∗ compact and convex set of probability
measures CA.
We are interested in preferences conditional on events which are (ex ante) unambigu-
ously non-null in the following sense:
Definition 37 We say that A ∈ Σ is unambiguously non-null if xAy ↓ y for some
(all) x  y.
That is, an event is unambiguously non-null if betting on A is unambiguosly better than
getting the loss payoff y for sure (notice that this is stronger than the definition of non-
null event in [14], which just requires that xAy  y). This property is equivalently
restated in terms of the possible scenarios C as follows: P (A) > 0 for all P ∈ C.
We next assume that conditional on being informed of A, the DM only cares about
an act’s results on A, a natural assumption.
Axiom 7 (Consequentialism) For every A ∈ Π, f ∼A f A g for every f, g ∈ F.
Consequentialism extends immediately to the unambiguous and lower envelope preference
relations, as the following result shows:
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Lemma 38 For every A ∈ Π, the following statements are equivalent:15
(i) f ∼A f A g for every f, g ∈ F.
(ii) f∪∼A f A g for every f, g ∈ F.
(iii) f ∼↓A f A g for every f, g ∈ F.
For the remainder of this section we tacitly assume that all the preferences <A, for
A ∈ Π′, satisfy axiom 7 (alongside axioms 1–5).
An important property linking ex ante and ex post preferences is dynamic consis-
tency: For all A ∈ Π and all f, g ∈ F,
f A g < g ⇐⇒ f <A g. (9)
This property imposes two requirements. The first says that the DM should consistently
carry out plans made ex ante. The second says that information is valuable to the DM,
in the sense that postponing her choice to after knowing whether an event obtained does
not make her worse off (see Ghirardato [11] for a more detailed discussion).
It is possible to find several plausible instances in which the presence of ambiguity
explains behavior that violates dynamic consistency (see Siniscalchi [28] for elaboration).
However, we think that in the absence of ambiguity dynamic consistency retains much
of its intuitive appeal. It thus seems to be a natural exercise to inquire the effect of
requiring dynamic consistency of the unambiguous preference relations ∪<A , for A ∈ Π,
with respect to the ex ante ∪< (that is, requiring Eq. (9) with < and <A replaced by∪< and ∪<A respectively).
We now show that (for a preference satisfying axiom 7) this is tantamount to assuming
that the DM updates all the priors in C, a procedure that we call generalized Bayesian
updating: For every A ∈ Π, the “updated” perception of ambiguity is equal to
C|A ≡ cow∗{PA : P ∈ C},
where PA denotes the posterior of P conditional on A, and co
w∗ stands for the weak*
closure of the convex hull.
Proposition 39 Suppose that A ∈ Π is unambiguously non-null. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
15In this and the remaining results of this section, we omit the equivalent statements involving the
upper envelope preference relation.
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(i) For every f, g ∈ F,
f∪<A g ⇐⇒ PA(u(f)) ≥ PA(u(g)) for all P ∈ C. (10)
Equivalently, CA = C|A and uA = u.
(ii) The relation ∪< is dynamically consistent with respect to A. That is, for every
f, g ∈ F:
f∪<A g ⇐⇒ f A g∪< g. (11)
(iii) For every x, x′ ∈ X, x < x′ ⇒ x <A x′. For every f ∈ F and x ∈ X:
x ∈ NA(f)⇐⇒ x ∈ N(f Ax). (12)
(iv) For every f ∈ F and x ∈ X:
f <↓A x⇐⇒ f Ax <↓ x. (13)
Alongside the promised equivalence with dynamic consistency of unambiguous prefer-
ence, this results presents two other characterizations of generalized Bayesian updating.
They are inspired by a result of Siniscalchi [28], who shows that when the primitive pref-
erence relations {<A}A∈Π′ are 1-MEU, generalized Bayesian updating is characterized by
(a condition equivalent to)
f <A (∼A)x⇐⇒ f Ax < (∼)x (14)
for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X. Statement (iii) in the proposition departs from the indifference
part of Eq. (14) and applies its logic to the “indifference” notion that is generated by the
incomplete preference ∪< . Statement (iv) is a direct generalization of Siniscalchi’s result
to preferences that do not satisfy ambiguity hedging. Notice that Eq. (13) is equivalent
to requiring that f∪<A x if and only if fAx∪< x, a weakening of Eq. (11) that under the
assumptions of the proposition is equivalent to it.
It is straightforward to show that dynamic consistency of the primitives {<A}A∈Π′ im-
plies condition (ii). Thus, dynamic consistency of the primitives is a sufficient condition
for generalized Bayesian updating. However, it is easy to verify that it is not necessary
(Siniscalchi [28] presents an example with a 1-MEU preference).
A different way of reinforcing the conditions of Proposition 39 is to consider impos-
ing the full strength of dynamic consistency on the lower envelope preference relations,
rather than the weaker form seen in Eq. (13). We next show that this leads to the
characterization of the notion of rectangularity introduced by Epstein and Schneider [7].
37
Suppose that the class Π forms a finite partition of S; i.e., Π = {A1, . . . , An}. Given
a set of probabilities C such that each Ai is unambiguously nonnull, we define
[C] =
{
P : ∃Q,P1, . . . , Pn such that ∀B ∈ Σ, P (B) =
n∑
i=1
Pi(B|Ai)Q(Ai)
}
.
We say that C is Π-rectangular if C = [C].16 (We refer the reader to Epstein and
Schneider [7] for more discussion of this concept.)
Proposition 40 Suppose that Π is a partition and that every A ∈ Π is unambiguously
non-null. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) C is Π-rectangular, and uA = u and CA = C|A for every A ∈ Π.
(ii) For every f, g ∈ F and A ∈ Π:
f <↓A g ⇐⇒ f A g <↓ g.
The rationale for this result is straightforward: Since the preference <↓ is 1-MEU with set
of priors C, it follows from the anlysis of Epstein and Schneider [7] that C is rectangular
and that for every A ∈ Π, CA is obtained by generalized Bayesian updating. By definition
of <↓A, the sets CA are also those that represent the ambiguity perception of the primitive
relations <A.
We have therefore shown that the characterization of rectangularity and generalized
Bayesian updating of Epstein and Schneider can be extended to preferences which do not
satisfy ambiguity hedging, having taken care to require dynamic consistency of the lower
envelope (or equivalently of the upper envelope), rather than of the primitive, preference
relations. The relations between dynamic consistency of the primitives {<A}A∈Π′ and of
the lower envelopes {<↓A}A∈Π′ are not obvious and are the object of ongoing research.
16We owe this presentation of rectangularity to Marciano Siniscalchi.
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Appendix A Functional Analysis Toolkit
In this appendix we provide/review some functional analytic results and notions that
are used to prove the results in the main text (and in some cases directly mentioned in
Section 4).
A.1 Conic Preorders
We recall that B0(Σ) is the vector space generated by the indicator functions of the
elements of Σ. We denote by ba(Σ) the set of the bounded, finitely additive set functions
on Σ, and by pc(Σ) the set of the probability charges on Σ. As it is well known, ba(Σ),
endowed with the total variation norm, is isometrically isomorphic to the norm dual of
B0(Σ).
Given a non singleton interval K in the real line (whose interior is denoted K◦) we
denote by B0(Σ, K) the subset of the functions in B0(Σ) taking values in K. Clearly,
B0(Σ) = B0(Σ,R).
We recall that a binary relation & on B0(Σ, K) is:
• a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive;
• continuous if ϕn & ψn for all n ∈ N, ϕn → ϕ and ψn → ψ imply ϕ & ψ;
• conic if ϕ & ψ implies αϕ + (1− α) θ & αψ + (1− α) θ for all θ ∈ B0(Σ, K) and
all α ∈ [0, 1]; 17
• monotonic if ϕ ≥ ψ implies ϕ & ψ.
• nontrivial if there exists ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ, K) such that ϕ & ψ but not ψ & ϕ.
Next, we have some useful representation results.
Proposition 41 For i = 1, 2, let Ci be nonempty sets of probability charges on Σ and &i
be the relations defined on B0(Σ, K) by
ϕ &i ψ ⇐⇒
∫
S
ϕdP ≥
∫
S
ψ dP for all P ∈ Ci.
17Notice that if K = R or R+ and & is a preorder, then & is conic iff ϕ & ψ implies αϕ+ θ & αψ + θ
for all θ ∈ B0(Σ) and all α ∈ R+.
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Then
ϕ &i ψ ⇐⇒
∫
S
ϕdP ≥
∫
S
ψ dP for all P ∈ cow∗(Ci),
and the following statements are equivalent:
(i) ϕ &1 ψ =⇒ ϕ &2 ψ for all ϕ and ψ in B0(Σ, K).
(ii) cow
∗
(C2) ⊆ cow∗(C1).
(iii) [infP∈C2 P (ϕ), supP∈C2 P (ϕ)] ⊆ [infP∈C1 P (ϕ), supP∈C1 P (ϕ)] for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ, K).
Proof. If ϕ &i ψ, then
∫
ϕdP ≥ ∫ ψ dP for all P ∈ Ci. Hence, for all n ∈ N, all
P1, P2, ..., Pn ∈ Ci, and all α1, ..., αn ≥ 0 such that
∑n
1 αi = 1:
n∑
1
αi
∫
S
ϕdPi ≥
n∑
1
αi
∫
S
ψ dPi for all P ∈ co(Ci).
That is, ∫
S
ϕdP ≥
∫
S
ψ dP for all P ∈ co (Ci) .
Let P ∈ cow∗(Ci). There exists a net Pa ∈ co(Ci) such that Pa(θ) → P (θ) for all θ ∈
B0(Σ), in particular Pa(ϕ)→ P (ϕ) and Pa(ψ)→ P (ψ), then P (ϕ) ≥ P (ψ). Conversely,
it is obvious that
∫
ϕdP ≥ ∫ ψ dP for all P ∈ cow∗(Ci) implies ∫ ϕdP ≥ ∫ ψ dP for all
P ∈ Ci. That is, ϕ &i ψ.
We can now prove (i) ⇒ (ii). In view of what we have just shown, it is w.l.o.g. to
assume that C1 and C2 are weak* closed and convex. Let ϕ &1 ψ =⇒ ϕ &2 ψ and, by
contradiction, assume that P ′ ∈ C2 \ C1. The cone K1 = {αP : α ≥ 0, P ∈ C1} generated
by C1 is weak* closed and convex. In fact, let αP, βQ ∈ K1 (i.e., α, β ≥ 0 and P,Q ∈ C1).
If α = β = 0, then αP + βQ = 0 ∈ K1; else αP + βQ = (α + β)( αα+βP + βα+βQ) ∈ C1.
Therefore, K1 is convex. Let {βaPa} be a net in K1 (i.e., βa ≥ 0 and Pa ∈ C1 for all
a) such that βaPa
∗
⇀ L; if m = 0, then L ∈ K1; else m = βP for suitable β > 0 and
P ∈ pc(Σ). In particular, βaPa(S) → βP (S) and βa → β, therefore 1βa (βaPa)
∗
⇀ 1
β
(βP )
so m = β lima Pa ∈ K1.
Clearly P ′ /∈ K1 (else P ′ = αP for some α ≥ 0 and P ∈ C1). Thus, by the Separating
Hyperplane Theorem there exists ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) \ {0} such that
m(ϕ) ≥ 0 > P ′(ϕ) for all m ∈ K1. (15)
Consider κ ∈ K◦ (it must exist since K is not a singleton) and α > 0 such that αϕ+κ ∈
B0(Σ, K). Eq. (15) yields αϕ+κ &1 κ and αϕ+κ 6&2 κ, which is absurd. The implication
(ii)⇒ (i) is immediate.
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Next, we show that, for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ, K),
inf
P∈Ci
P (ϕ) = min
Q∈cow∗ (Ci)
Q(ϕ).
Clearly, infCi P (ϕ) ≥ mincow∗ (Ci)Q(ϕ). If it were infCi P (ϕ) > mincow∗ (Ci)Q(ϕ), there
would exists ε > 0 such that infCi P (ϕ) > ε > mincow∗ (Ci)Q(ϕ). Thus, for all n ∈ N, all
P1, P2, ..., Pn ∈ Ci and all α1, ..., αn ≥ 0 such that
∑n
1 αi = 1:
n∑
1
αiPi(ϕ) ≥
n∑
1
αiε = ε.
That is,
inf
co(Ci)
P (ϕ) ≥ ε.
But for all Q ∈ cow∗(Ci) there exists a net Pa ∈ co(Ci) such that Pa(ϕ)→ Q(ϕ). Hence,
Q(ϕ) ≥ ε, which is a contradiction. Analogously we show that
sup
P∈Ci
P (ϕ) = max
Q∈cow∗ (Ci)
Q(ϕ),
for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ, K). The implication (ii)⇒ (iii) is now obvious.
As to the implication (iii) ⇒ (ii), it is again w.l.o.g. to assume that C1 and C2 are
weak* closed and convex, so that the result follows from an application of the Separating
Hyperplane Theorem. 
Proposition 42 & is a nontrivial, continuous, conic, and monotonic preorder on B0(Σ, K)
if and only if there exists a nonempty subset C of pc(Σ) such that
ϕ & ψ ⇐⇒
∫
S
ϕdP ≥
∫
S
ψ dP for all P ∈ C. (16)
Moreover, cow
∗
(C) is the unique weak* closed and convex subset of pc(Σ) representing &
in the sense of Eq. (16).
Proof. Let κ0 ∈ K◦, for all ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0) set ϕ &′ ψ ⇔ ϕ + κ0 & ψ + κ0. It
is easy to verify that &′ is a nontrivial, continuous, conic, and monotonic preorder on
B0(Σ, K − κ0).
Claim. If ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0), the following facts are equivalent:
(i) ϕ &′ ψ,
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(ii) there exists α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0) and αϕ &′ αψ,
(iii) for all α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0) : αϕ &′ αψ.
Proof of the Claim. (i) ⇒ (ii) and (iii) ⇒ (i) are obvious. We show (ii) ⇒ (iii).
By contradiction, assume there exists α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0) and
αϕ &′ αψ. If 0 < β ≤ α, then βϕ = β
α
αϕ+(1− β
α
)0 &′ β
α
αψ+(1− β
α
)0 = βψ. Therefore,
if there exists β > 0 such that βϕ, βψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0) and not βϕ &′ βψ, then it have
to be β > α > 0. Let ϕ¯ = βϕ and ψ¯ = βψ, ϕ¯, ψ¯ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0) and not ϕ¯ &′ ψ¯, but
α
β
ϕ¯ &′ α
β
ψ¯. Let γ¯ = sup{γ ∈ [0, 1] : α
β
ϕ¯ &′ α
β
ψ¯},by continuity, γ¯ϕ¯ &′ γ¯ψ¯, hence δϕ¯ &′ δψ¯
for all δ ∈ [0, γ¯]. Then,
1
1+γ¯
γ¯ϕ¯+ γ¯
1+γ¯
ϕ¯ &′ 1
1+γ¯
γ¯ψ¯ + γ¯
1+γ¯
ϕ¯ = 1
1+γ¯
γ¯ϕ¯+ γ¯
1+γ¯
ψ¯ &′ 1
1+γ¯
γ¯ψ¯ + γ¯
1+γ¯
ψ¯
so that 2γ¯
1+γ¯
ϕ¯ &′ 2γ¯
1+γ¯
ψ¯. But by definition of γ¯, 2γ¯
1+γ¯
≤ γ¯, that is, γ¯2 − γ¯ ≥ 0. Since γ¯ > 0,
therefore, we have γ¯ = 1, and hence γ¯ϕ¯ &′ γ¯ψ¯, which is absurd. 
For all ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ), set ϕ &′′ ψ ⇐⇒ αϕ &′ αψ for some (all) α > 0 such that
αϕ, αψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0). Clearly, if ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ, K − κ0), then ϕ &′′ ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ &′ ψ.
It is also easy to verify that ϕ &′′ ψ is a nontrivial, continuous, conic, and monotonic
preorder on B0(Σ).
Let K be the set of charges on Σ defined by
K = {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(ϕ) ≥ 0 for all ϕ &′′ 0}.
Clearly 0 ∈ K and it is trivial to verify that K is a convex cone. Let {ma} be a net in K
which weak* converges to m, for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ), ma(ψ)→ m(ψ), in particular, if ϕ &′′ 0,
m(ϕ) = limama(ϕ) ≥ 0. Hence K is σ(ba(Σ), B0(Σ))-closed.
If ϕ &′′ ψ, then ϕ − ψ &′′ 0. Hence, m(ϕ − ψ) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ K; that is, m(ϕ) ≥ m(ψ)
∀m ∈ K. Conversely, assume m(ϕ′) ≥ m(ψ′), ∀m ∈ K and not ϕ′ &′′ ψ′. Consider the
closed convex cone defined by
C(&′′) ≡ {ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) : ϕ &′′ 0}.
Then ξ′ = ϕ′ − ψ′ /∈ C(&′′) and, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem there exists
m′ ∈ ba(Σ) such that
m′(ϕ) ≥ 0 > L′(ξ′) ∀ϕ ∈ C(&′′).
That is, m′ ∈ K and m′(ξ′) < 0, so m′(ϕ′) < m′(ψ′), which is absurd. We have thus
shown that
ϕ &′′ ψ ⇐⇒ m(ϕ) ≥ m(ψ) for all m ∈ K.
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Since for all A ∈ Σ, 1A ≥ 0, monotonicity implies that m(A) = m(1A) ≥ 0. Thus, K
consists of nonnegative elements of ba(Σ). Since K = {0} contradicts nontriviality, we
have K 6= {0} and
ϕ &′′ ψ ⇐⇒ m(ϕ) ≥ m(ψ) for all m ∈ K \ {0}.
That is,
ϕ &′′ ψ ⇐⇒ m(ϕ)
m(S)
≥ m(ψ)
m(S)
for all m ∈ K \ {0}.
Letting C denote the set of all the probability charges in K, we have
ϕ &′′ ψ ⇐⇒ P (ϕ) ≥ P (ψ) for all P ∈ C.
C is weak* closed and convex since C = K ∩ pc(Σ), the intersection of two weak* closed
and convex sets. Moreover, for all ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ, K),
ϕ & ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ− κ0 &′ ψ − κ0
⇐⇒ P (ϕ− κ0) ≥ P (ψ − κ0) for all P ∈ C
⇐⇒ P (ϕ) ≥ P (ψ) for all P ∈ C,
as wanted. Uniqueness follows from Proposition 41. 
A.2 Clarke Derivatives and Differentials
Recall that a functional I : B0(Σ)→ R is:
• monotonic if I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ) for all ϕ ≥ ψ;
• constant additive if I(ϕ+ α) = I(ϕ) + α for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) and α ∈ R;
• positively homogeneous if I(αϕ) = αI(ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) and α ∈ R+;
• constant linear if it is constant additive and positively homogeneous.
A monotonic constant linear functional I : B0(Σ) → R is Lipschitz of rank 1. For,
given ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ), ϕ ≤ ψ+‖ϕ−ψ‖ implies I(ϕ) ≤ I(ψ)+‖ϕ−ψ‖, hence I(ϕ)−I(ψ) ≤
‖ϕ − ψ‖; switching ϕ and ψ yields |I(ϕ) − I(ψ)| ≤ ‖ϕ − ψ‖. It follows that I is also
uniformly continuous.
Thus, given a monotonic constant linear functional I : B0(Σ)→ R, we can study its
Clarke derivatives and Clarke differentials as defined in Clarke [5]:
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Definition 43 The Clarke (upper) derivative of I in ϕ in the direction υ is
I◦(ϕ; υ) =lim sup
ψ→ϕ
t↓0
I(ψ + tυ)− I(ψ)
t
.
Notice that the expression on the r.h.s. is equal to
lim
ε→0
 sup
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I(ψ + tυ)− I(ψ)
t

with δ and γ fixed positive numbers (which is easily shown to be independent of δ and
γ).
Definition 44 The Clarke differential of I in ϕ is the set
∂I(ϕ) = {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(υ) ≤ I◦(ϕ; υ), ∀υ ∈ B0(Σ)}.
The next result sums up some basic results about the Clarke derivative and differential
drawn from Clarke [5].
Proposition 45 Let I : B0(Σ)→ R be Lipschitz of rank r. Then:
1. For all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ), the function I◦(ϕ; ·) : B0(Σ) → R is finite, sublinear and
Lipschitz of rank r. Moreover, if ϕi → ϕ and υi → υ, then
lim sup
i→∞
I◦(ϕi; υi) ≤ I◦(ϕ; υ).
2. For all ϕ, υ ∈ B0(Σ), I◦(ϕ;−υ) = (−I)◦(ϕ; υ).
3. ∂I(ϕ) is a nonempty, convex, weak* compact subset of ba(Σ) and ‖m‖BV ≤ r for
every m ∈ ∂I(ϕ).
4. For every υ ∈ B0(Σ),
I◦(ϕ; υ) = max
m∈∂I(ϕ)
m(υ).
5. For all ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ), there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
I(ϕ)− I(ψ) ∈ 〈∂I(γϕ+ (1− γ)ψ), ϕ− ψ〉 .
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6. If I is also convex, then Clarke derivatives are the usual directional derivatives
and Clarke differentials are subdifferentials. That is, I◦(ϕ; υ) = limt↓0 t−1(I(ϕ +
tυ) − I(ϕ)) for all ϕ, υ ∈ B0(Σ), and ∂I(ϕ) = {m ∈ ba(Σ) : m(υ) − m(ϕ) ≤
I(υ)− I(ϕ) ∀υ ∈ B0(Σ)} for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ).
7. If J : B0(Σ)→ R is another Lipschitz functional and λ, µ > 0, then
∂(λI + µJ)(ϕ) ⊆ λ∂I(ϕ) + µ∂J(ϕ).
It will be recalled that in Section 4 we also defined a Clarke lower derivative, and
defined the Clarke differential in terms of that. The next result shows that this (presen-
tational) choice does not make a difference.
Lemma 46 For every ϕ ∈ B0(Σ), υ ∈ B0(Σ),
I◦(ϕ;−υ) = −I◦(ϕ; υ).
In particular,
I◦(ϕ; υ) = min
m∈∂I(ϕ)
m(υ).
Proof. For every ϕ, υ ∈ B0(Σ), we have
I◦(ϕ;−υ) = (−I)◦(ϕ; υ) =
= lim
ε→0
 sup
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
−I(ψ + tυ) + I(ψ)
t

= lim
ε→0
− inf
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I(ψ + tυ)− I(ψ)
t

= − lim
ε→0
 inf
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I(ψ + tυ)− I(ψ)
t

= −I◦(ϕ; υ).

It follows that the set defined in Section 4 coincides with the Clarke differential as
defined above. For easier reference to the existing literature in the rest of this subsection
we use the traditional I◦, but the lemma can be used to adapt all the results to I◦.
We next prove some additional properties of I◦ and ∂I(·) that we use below, in
particular for our case of interest of a monotonic and constant linear I.
45
Proposition 47 Let I : B0(Σ)→ R be a Lipschitz functional. Then:
1. If I is positively homogenous, I◦(ϕ; ·) = I◦(αϕ; ·) for all α > 0, and ∂I(ϕ) ⊆ ∂I(0)
for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ).
2. If I is monotone, then for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) the function I◦(ϕ; ·) is monotone, and m
is positive for all m ∈ ∂I(ϕ).
3. If I is constant additive, then for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) the function I◦(ϕ; ·) is constant
linear, and m(S) = 1 for all m ∈ ∂I(ϕ).
Proof. 1.) For all α > 0,
I◦(αϕ; υ) = lim
ε→0
 sup
‖ψ−αϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I
(
ψ
t
+ υ
)
− I
(
ψ
t
)
= lim
ε→0
 sup
‖θ−ϕ‖≤ δ
α
ε
0<r< γ
α
ε
I
(
θ
r
+ υ
)
− I
(
θ
r
) = I◦(ϕ; υ).
That is, I◦(αϕ; υ) = I◦(ϕ; υ) for all ϕ, υ ∈ B0(Σ) and all α > 0. Therefore,
max
m∈∂I(0)
m(υ) = I◦(0; υ) = I◦
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
ϕ; υ
)
≥ lim sup
n→∞
I◦
(
1
n
ϕ; υ
)
= I◦(ϕ; υ) = max
m∈∂I(ϕ)
m(υ),
whence ∂I(ϕ) ⊆ ∂I(0).
2.) If υ ≤ 0, then ψ + tυ ≤ ψ for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ) and all t > 0. Hence, (I(ψ + tυ) −
I(ψ))/t ≤ 0 for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ) and all t > 0, so that
I◦(ϕ; υ) =lim sup
ψ→ϕ
t↓0
I(ψ + tυ)− I(ψ)
t
≤ 0.
If υ ≥ 0 and m ∈ ∂I(ϕ), −υ ≤ 0 and m(−υ) ≤ I◦(ϕ;−υ) ≤ 0, hence m(υ) ≥ 0. If
υ ≥ υ′, then
I◦(ϕ; υ) = max
m∈∂I(ϕ)
m(υ) ≥ max
m∈∂I(ϕ)
m(υ′) = I◦(ϕ; υ′).
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3.) Since I◦(ϕ; ·) is sublinear, it suffices to prove that it is constant additive. For all
ϕ, υ ∈ B0(Σ) and all β ∈ R,
I◦(ϕ; υ + β) = lim
ε→0
 sup
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I(ψ + t(υ + β))− I(ψ)
t

= lim
ε→0
 sup
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I(ψ + tυ) + tβ − I(ψ)
t

= lim
ε→0
 sup
‖ψ−ϕ‖≤δε
0<t<γε
I(ψ + tυ)− I(ψ)
t
+ β
= I◦(ϕ; υ) + β
and I◦(ϕ; ·) is constant additive. In particular, I◦(ϕ; 1S)+I◦(ϕ;−1S) = I◦(ϕ; 1S−1S) = 0.
For all m ∈ ∂I(ϕ), m(S) ≤ I◦(ϕ; 1S) = −I◦(ϕ;−1S) ≤ −m(−1S) = m(S). That is,
m(S) = I◦(ϕ; 1S) = 1. 
Notice that it follows from this proposition that if I is monotonic and constant linear,
then ∂I(ϕ) ⊆ ∂I(0) ⊆ pc(Σ) for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ). That is, the Clarke differential only
contains probability charges.
The next lemma characterizes the Clarke derivatives in terms of increments of the
functional I.
Lemma 48 Let I : B0(Σ)→ R be a monotonic, constant linear functional. Then for all
ϕ ∈ B0(Σ),
I◦(0;ϕ) = sup
ψ∈B0(Σ)
I(ψ + ϕ)− I(ψ) and I◦(0;ϕ) = inf
ψ∈B0(Σ)
I(ψ + ϕ)− I(ψ) (17)
Proof. By homogeneity,
I◦(0;ϕ) = lim sup
ψ→0
t↓0
I(ψ + tϕ)− I(ψ)
t
= lim sup
ψ→0
t↓0
I
(
ψ
t
+ ϕ
)
− I
(
ψ
t
)
≤ sup
ψ∈B0(Σ)
(I(ψ + ϕ)− I(ψ)).
On the other hand, by the Mean Value Theorem (point 4 of Proposition 45), for each
ψ ∈ B0(Σ) there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that, letting ξ = γ(ψ + ϕ) + (1− γ)ψ,
I(ψ + ϕ)− I(ψ) ∈ 〈∂I(ξ), ϕ〉 .
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By point 1 of Proposition 47, ∂I(ξ) ⊆ ∂I(0). Hence, there is L ∈ ∂I(0) such that
I(ψ + ϕ) − I(ψ) = L(ϕ). Hence, I(ψ + ϕ) − I(ψ) ≤ I◦(0;ϕ) for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ), which
implies supψ∈B0(Σ)(I(ψ + ϕ) − I(ψ)) ≤ I◦(0;ϕ). We conclude that the equation on the
l.h.s. of Eq. (17) holds. The proof for the other equation is analogous. 
We conclude this appendix by recalling Clarke’s characterization of Clarke differentials
in finite dimensional spaces. Here we assume that B0(Σ) = Rn and denote the standard
gradients by ∇ as customary.
Theorem 49 (Clarke, 2.5.1.) Let I : Rn → R be a Lipschitz functional, and let Ω be
any set of Lebesgue measure 0 in Rn such that I is differentiable on Ωc. Then
∂I(ϕ) = co
{
lim
i→∞
∇I(ϕi) : ϕi ∈ Ωc, ϕi → ϕ, and ∇I(ϕi) converges
}
.
Appendix B Proofs of the Results in the Main Text
We begin with two preliminary remarks and a piece of notation, that are used throughout
this appendix. First, given the representation in Lemma 1, we observe without proof that
{u(f) : f ∈ F} ≡ {ϕ ∈ B0(Σ,R) : ϕ = u(f), for some f ∈ F} = B0(Σ, u(X)).
Second, notice that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that u(X) ⊇ [−1, 1]. Finally, given a
nonempty, convex and weak* compact set C of probability charges on (S,Σ), we denote
for every ϕ ∈ B0(Σ),
C(ϕ) = min
P∈C
P (ϕ), C(ϕ) = max
P∈C
P (ϕ).
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Taking λ = 1 in the definition proves point 1. Next we prove that ∪< is monotonic
(point 4). Suppose that f(s) < g(s) for all s ∈ S. By axiom 2, for every h ∈ F and
λ ∈ (0, 1], λf(s)+(1−λ)h(s) < λg(s)+(1−λ)h(s) for all s ∈ S. Using axiom 4, we thus
obtain that λf + (1 − λ)h < λg + (1 − λ)h. This shows that f∪< g. If x < y, then the
monotonicity of ∪< yields x∪< y. Along with point 1, this proves point 2. As to point 3,
reflexivity also follows from monotonicity. To show transitivity, suppose that f∪< g and
g∪< h. Then for all k ∈ F and all λ ∈ (0, 1], we have
λf + (1− λ)k < λg + (1− λ)k < λh+ (1− λ)k.
48
This shows that f∪< h.
Next, we prove point 5. Given f, g, h ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1), suppose that f∪< g. Then
for every µ ∈ (0, 1] and every k ∈ F, we have
(λµ)f + (1− λµ)
[
(1− λ)µ
1− λµ h+
1− µ
1− λµk
]
< (λµ)g + (1− λµ)
[
(1− λ)µ
1− λµ h+
1− µ
1− λµk
]
by definition of ∪< . Rearranging terms, we find
µ(λf + (1− λ)h) + (1− µ)k < µ(λg + (1− λ)h) + (1− µ)k,
which implies λf + (1− λ)h∪< λg + (1− λ)h, since the choice of µ and k was arbitrary.
The case λ = 1 is trivial. Point 6 follows immediately from the following Proposition 4.
(It is not used in the proof of that proposition.)
Finally, assume that ∪<′ is an independent binary relation such that f∪<′ g implies
f < g. Then f∪<′ g implies λf + (1 − λ)h∪<′ λg + (1 − λ)h for all h ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1],
hence λf + (1 − λ)h < λg + (1 − λ)h for all h ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1], finally f∪< g. This
proves 7.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Notice that f∪< g iff I(λu(f) + (1− λ)u(h)) ≥ I(λu(g) + (1− λ)u(h)) for all h ∈ F and
all λ ∈ (0, 1]. Define & on B0(Σ, u(X)) by setting
ϕ & ψ ⇐⇒ I(λϕ+ (1− λ)θ) ≥ I(λψ + (1− λ)θ), ∀θ ∈ B0(Σ, u(X)), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1].
Clearly, f∪< g iff u(f) & u(g). It is routine to show, either using the properties of ∪<
or those of I, that & is a nontrivial, monotonic and conic preorder on B0(Σ, u(X)).
Moreover, if ϕn1 & ϕn2 for all n ∈ N, ϕn1 → ϕ1, ϕn2 → ϕ2, then I(λϕn1 + (1 − λ)θ) ≥
I(λϕn2 + (1 − λ)θ), for all λ ∈ (0, 1], all θ ∈ B0(Σ, u(X)), and all n ∈ N. Since I is
supnorm continuous, it follows that ϕ1 & ϕ2.
We have thus shown that & is a conic, continuous, monotonic, nontrivial preorder on
B0(Σ, u(X)). By Lemma 42 it follows that there exists a nonempty, weak* closed and
convex set C of probability charges on Σ such that
ϕ & ψ ⇐⇒
∫
S
ϕdP ≥
∫
S
ψ dP for all P ∈ C,
which immediately yields the statement.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma 50 Let Y be a vector space and u, v be two nonzero linear functionals on Y .
One and only one of the following statements is true:
• u = av for some a > 0.
• ∃y ∈ Y : u(y) v(y) < 0.
Proof. Clearly the two statements cannot be both true. Assume, by contradiction that
both are false. That is: there exist u, v nonzero linear functionals on Y such that u 6= av
for all a > 0, and u(y) v(y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y .
Then Y = [uv > 0] ∪ [u = 0] ∪ [v = 0] = [uv > 0] ∪ keru ∪ ker v. keru and ker v
are maximal subspaces of Y , hence Y = 〈z〉 ⊕ keru for some z ∈ Y such that u(z) > 0.
If keru = ker v: for all y ∈ Y , exist b ∈ R, x ∈ keru such that y = bz + x, whence
u(y) = b u(z) =
u(z)
v(z)
b v(z) =
u(z)
v(z)
v(y), which is absurd. Else: keru 6= ker v, so there
exist y′ ∈ keru\ ker v and y′′ ∈ ker v\ keru (keru and ker v are maximal subspaces), we
can choose y′ and y′′ such that v(y′) > 0 and u(y′′) < 0. Finally, u(y′ + y′′)v(y′ + y′′) =
u(y′′)v(y′) < 0, which is absurd. 
Corollary 51 Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a vector space and u, v be two
nonconstant affine functionals on X. There exist a ∈ R++ and b ∈ R such that u = av+b
iff u(x1) ≥ u(x2) =⇒ v(x1) ≥ v(x2) for every x1, x2 ∈ X.
Proof. Necessity being trivial, we only prove sufficiency. Notice that
Y = {t(x1 − x2) : t ∈ R++, x1, x2 ∈ X}
is a vector space and the functionals
uˆ : t(x1 − x2) 7→ t(u(x1)− u(x2)),
vˆ : t(x1 − x2) 7→ t(v(x1)− v(x2))
are well defined, nonzero, and linear on Y . Moreover,
uˆ(t(x1 − x2)) ≥ 0 =⇒ u(x1) ≥ u(x2) =⇒ v(x1) ≥ v(x2) =⇒ v(t(x1 − x2)) ≥ 0.
Therefore @y ∈ Y such that uˆ(y) vˆ(y) < 0. By the previous lemma, there exists a > 0
such that uˆ = avˆ. Finally, fix x◦ ∈ X, for all x ∈ X
u(x)− u(x◦) = uˆ(1(x− x◦)) = avˆ(1(x− x◦)) = av(x)− av(x◦)
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so
u(x) = av(x) + [u(x◦)− av(x◦)],
set b = [u(x◦)− av(x◦)]. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i)⇒ (ii): For all x, y ∈ X,
u1(x) ≥ u1(y)⇐⇒ x <1 y =⇒ x∪<1 y =⇒ x∪<2 y =⇒ x <2 y ⇐⇒ u2(x) ≥ u2(y).
By Corollary 51, this implies that we can assume u1 = u2 = u. Moreover, for all f, g ∈ F,
f∪<1 g =⇒ f∪<2 g. That is,
P (u(f)) ≥ P (u(g)) ∀P ∈ C1 =⇒ P (u(f)) ≥ P (u(g)) ∀P ∈ C2,
which by Lemma 41 (applied to B0(Σ, u(X))) implies C2 ⊆ C1.
(ii)⇒ (i): Obvious.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The fact that (iii)⇒ (iv) follows from the observation that for all f ∈ F, if c(f) ∈ C(f),
I(u(f)) = u(c(f)) ∈ u(N(f)) = {P (u(f)) : P ∈ C}. On the other hand, if < has a
SEU representation with probability P (statement (iv)), then < satisfies independence
(statement (ii)), which implies that f < g implies f∪< g for all f, g ∈ F, so that <= ∪<
(statement (i)). By the uniqueness of the representation in Eq. (4), it follows that
C = {P} (statement (iii)), closing the chain.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 7
The result follows immediately (take ψ ≡ 0) from the following lemma, that will be of
further use.
Lemma 52 For all f ∈ F,
C(u(f)) = inf
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
= inf
ψ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(f) + ψ)− I(ψ)}
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and
C(u(f)) = sup
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u (g)
)}
= sup
ψ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(f) + ψ)− I(ψ)} .
Proof. Clearly { (1−λ)
λ
u(g) : g ∈ F, λ ∈ (0, 1]} ⊆ B0(Σ). Conversely, for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ)
there exists α ∈ (0, 1) and g ∈ F such that αψ = u(g) hence ψ = 1
α
u(g). Since (1−λ)
λ
ranges from 0 to ∞ (recall that λ ∈ (0, 1]), there exists λ∗ such that 1
α
= (1−λ
∗)
λ∗ and
ψ = (1−λ
∗)
λ∗ u(g). We have thus proved the second equality in both equations.
Given xmin ∈ X that satisfies u(xmin) = C(u(f)), we have f∪< xmin. That is, for all
g ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1]:
I(u(λxmin + (1− λ)g)) ≤ I(u(λf + (1− λ)g))
or
I(λu(xmin) + (1− λ)u(g)) ≤ I(λu(f) + (1− λ)u(g)).
Therefore,
λu(xmin) + I((1− λ)u(g)) ≤ I(λu(f) + (1− λ)u(g))
from which we obtain
u(xmin) ≤ I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
.
Finally,
C(u(f)) ≤ inf
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
.
Analogously,
sup
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
≤ C(u(f)).
Conversely, let xinf ∈ X be such that
u(xinf) = inf
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
.
Then,
u(xinf) ≤ I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
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for all g ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1], whence f∪< xinf . That is, u(xinf) ≤ C(u(f)), or
inf
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
≤ min
P∈C
P (u(f)).
Analogously,
sup
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
≥ max
P∈C
P (u(f)),
which concludes the proof.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 8
(i)⇒ (ii): Suppose that for some λ, λ′ and x, x′ ∈ X,
λ f + (1− λ)x∪∼ λ′ g + (1− λ′)x′,
which, applying Eq. (6) of Proposition 4, is equivalent to
λP (u(f)) + (1− λ)u(x) = λ′ P (u(g)) + (1− λ′)u(x′) for all P ∈ C.
It follows that for all P ∈ C,
P (u(f)) =
λ′
λ
P (u(g)) +
1
λ
[(1− λ′)u(x′)− (1− λ)u(x)],
so that we get the conclusion by letting
α =
λ′
λ
and β =
1
λ
[(1− λ′)u(x′)− (1− λ)u(x)].
(ii)⇒ (ii): Suppose that
P (u(f)) = αP (u(g)) + β for all P ∈ C.
Suppose first that α < 1. Then, let λ = α. By renormalizing the utility function if
necessary, we can assume that β/(1 − λ) ∈ u(X), so that there is x ∈ X for which
u(x) = β/(1− λ). It follows that
f ∪∼ λ g + (1− λ)x.
The case of α > 1 is dealt with by rewriting the equation as follows:
P (u(g)) =
1
α
P (u(f))− β for all P ∈ C,
53
and proceeding as above to get
λ f + (1− λ)x∪∼ g.
Finally, suppose that α = 1. Having chosen (renormalizing utility if necessary) x, x′ ∈ X
such that u(x) = 0 and u(x′) = β, it follows that
1
2
f +
1
2
x∪∼ 12g + 12x′.
(ii)⇒ (iii): Obvious.
(iii)⇒ (ii): Notice that the expected utility mappings
P 7→ P (u(f))
P 7→ P (u(g))
are affine functionals on C. Therefore, (by the standard uniqueness properties of affine
representations) they are isotonic iff one is a positive affine transformation of the other.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 10
(i)⇒ (iii): By Lemma 52,
C(u(k)) = inf
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(k) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)}
= inf
ϕ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ)}
and
C(u(k)) = sup
g∈F
λ∈(0,1]
{
I
(
u(k) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u (g)
)}
= sup
ϕ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ)} .
Suppose that k is crisp. Then for all f ∼ g and λ ∈ (0, 1],
λk + (1− λ)f ∼ λk + (1− λ)g.
That is,
I(λu(k) + (1− λ)u(f)) = I(λu(k) + (1− λ)u(g)),
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or, equivalently since I(u(f)) = I(u(g)),
I
(
u(k) +
1− λ
λ
u(f)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(f)
)
= I
(
u(k) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
.
Therefore, for all ψ, θ ∈ B0(Σ) such that I(ψ) = I(θ),
I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ) = I(u(k) + θ)− I(θ).
If I(ψ) 6= I(θ), set a = I(ψ)− I(θ). Then, I(ψ) = I(θ + a), whence
I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ) = I(u(k) + θ + a)− I(θ + a),
so that again
I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ) = I(u(k) + θ)− I(θ).
We conclude that if k is crisp
C(u(k)) = inf
ϕ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ)} = sup
ϕ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ)} = C(u(k)). (18)
(iii)⇒ (iv): From Eq. (18) (which is (iii)) we obtain
I(u(k) + ψ)− I(ψ) = I(u(k))
for all ψ ∈ B0 (Σ), whence for all λ ∈ (0, 1] and all g ∈ F:
I
(
u(k) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
= I(u(k))
or
I(λu(k) + (1− λ)u(g)) = λI(u(k)) + (1− λ)I(u(g)).
Finally, notice that the above equation is trivially true if λ = 0.
(iv)⇒ (i): If f ∼ g and λ ∈ (0, 1), it follows from (iv) that
I(λu(k) + (1− λ)u(f)) = λI(u(k)) + (1− λ)I(u(f))
= λI(u(k)) + (1− λ)I(u(g))
= I(λu(k) + (1− λ)u(g)),
whence
λk + (1− λ)f ∼ λk + (1− λ)g.
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(ii)⇒ (iii): Since k  x, there exist λ, λ′ and y, y′ such that
λ k + (1− λ) y∪∼ λ′ x+ (1− λ′) y′,
which, applying Proposition 4, is equivalent to
λP (u(k)) + (1− λ)u(y)∪∼ λ′ u(x) + (1− λ′)u(y′),
for every P ∈ C. This immediately implies (iii).
(iii) ⇒ (ii): Since P (u(k)) = γ for every P ∈ C, we just need to choose x ∈ X such
that u(x) = γ, and then apply Proposition 4 to see that k∪∼ x, yielding (ii).
B.8 Proof of Theorem 11
(i)⇒ (ii): Suppose that < satisfies axioms 1-5. Let I and u respectively be the preference
functional and utility that represent < obtained in Lemma 1, and C the weak∗ compact
and convex set of probabilities on Σ that represents ∪< obtained in Proposition 4.
We have observed in Proposition 7 that C(u(f)) ≤ I(u(f)) ≤ C(u(f)) for all f ∈ F.
Hence, if f is crisp then I(u(f)) = P (u(f)) for every P ∈ C. If f is not crisp, then there
exists a(u(f)) ∈ [0, 1] such that
I(u(f)) = a(u(f)) C(u(f)) + (1− a(u(f))) C(u(f)).
Such a(u(f)) is unique, for
a(u(f)) =
I(u(f))− C(u(f))
C(u(f))− C(u(f)) .
If we now recall the consequence of Lemma 8 and Proposition 10 that [x] is the set of
all crisp acts, we see that the function a(·) provides the sought representation. We are
therefore done if we prove that a can be defined on F/ \ {C} = F/ \ {[x]}.
Suppose that f  g. Then, there exist a pair of constants x, x′ ∈ X and weights
λ, λ′ ∈ (0, 1] such that
λ f + (1− λ)x∪∼ λ′ g + (1− λ′)x′. (19)
It follows from point 1 of Proposition 3 that Eq. (19) implies
I(λu(f) + (1− λ)u(x)) = I(λ′u(g) + (1− λ′)u(x′))
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so that, by the constant linearity of I:
λI(u(f)) + (1− λ)u(x) = λ′I(u(g)) + (1− λ′)u(x′).
As a consequence,
I(u(f)) =
λ′
λ
I(u(g)) +
1
λ′
[(1− λ′)u(x′)− (1− λ)u(x)].
If we set β = 1
λ
[(1− λ′)u(x′)′ − (1− λ)u(x)] and α = λ′/λ, we then obtain
I(u(f)) = αI(u(g)) + β.
Notice that Eq. (19) also implies that for every P ∈ C,
λP (u(f)) + (1− λ)u(x) = λ′P (u(g)) + (1− λ′)u(x′).
That is, P (u(f)) = αP (u(g)) + β for every P ∈ C. We conclude that
a(u(f)) =
I(u(f))− C(u(f))
C(u(f))− C(u(f))
=
αI(u(g)) + β −maxP∈C(αP (u(g)) + β)
minP∈C(αP (u(g)) + β)−maxP∈C(αP (u(g)) + β)
= a(u(g)).
Therefore, a(u(f)) = a(u(g)) whenever f  g. If, with a little abuse of notation, we let
a([f ]) = a(u(f)), we find that a : (F/ \ {[x]})→ [0, 1], as claimed.
(ii)⇒ (i): Obvious.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 12
Since <1 and <2 perceive identical ambiguity, we have C1 = C2 = C and we can assume
u1 = u2 = u. If C is a singleton, then <1 and <2 coincide, hence <1 is more ambiguity
averse than <2 and a1([f ]) ≥ a2([f ]) for every f ∈ F \ [x] = ∅. Therefore, we assume
|C| > 1.
Suppose that <1 is more ambiguity averse than <2. Fix f ∈ F \ C, and let x ∈ X be
indifferent to f for <2. We have:
a2([f ]) C(u(f)) + (1− a2([f ]) C(u(f)) = u(x)
≥ a1([f ]) C(u(f)) + (1− a1([f ]) C(u(f)).
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That is,
a2([f ])
(C(u(f))− C(u(f)))+ C(u(f)) ≥ a1([f ]) (C(u(f))− C(u(f)))+ C(u(f)),
whence a1([f ]) ≥ a2([f ]).
Conversely, suppose that a1([f ]) ≥ a2([f ]) for every f ∈ F \ C. For all x ∈ X,
x <2 f ⇔ u(x) ≥ a2(u(f))
(C(u(f))− C(u(f)))+ C(u(f))
⇒ u(x) ≥ a1(u(f))
(C(u(f))− C(u(f)))+ C(u(f))
⇒ x <1 f.
On the other hand, for all f ∈ C and all x ∈ X, we can take P ∈ C to obtain:
x <2 f ⇔ u(x) ≥ P (u(f))
⇔ x <1 f.
B.10 Proof of Theorem 15
For all f ∈ F, Lemma 52 yields
max
P∈C
P (u(f)) = sup
ϕ∈B0(Σ)
{I(u(f) + ψ)− I(ψ)} ,
while Lemma 48 yields
sup
ψ∈B0(Σ)
I(u(f) + ψ)− I(ψ) = I◦(0;u(f)) = max
P∈∂I(0)
P (u(f)).
But, for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ), there exist λ ∈ (0, 1) and f ∈ F such that λϕ = u(f). Hence,
max
P∈C
P (ϕ) = max
P∈C
P
(
1
λ
u(f)
)
= max
P∈∂I(0)
P
(
1
λ
u(f)
)
= max
P∈∂I(0)
P (ϕ).
Since both C and ∂I(0) are weak*-compact and convex subsets of ba(Σ), we conclude
that C = ∂I(0).
B.11 Proof of Proposition 17
If m ∈ Core(I), then m(ξ) ≥ I(ξ) ≥ infψ∈B0(Σ) I(ψ + ξ) − I(ψ) = I◦(0; ξ). Analogously,
if m ∈ Anticore(I), then m(ξ) ≤ I(ξ) ≤ supψ∈B0(Σ) I(ψ + ξ)− I(ψ) = I◦(0; ξ).
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If Anticore(I) = ∂I(0), then
I◦(0; ξ) = max
m∈∂I(0)
m (ξ) = max
m∈Core(I)
m (ξ) ≤ I(ξ) ≤ I◦(0; ξ)
for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ), so I◦(0; ·) = I(·) and I is convex. Conversely, if I is convex, point 6 of
Proposition 45 guarantees that ∂I(0) = Anticore(I). (The concave case is analogous.)
B.12 Proof of Corollary 18
Notice that the set Ω = {ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) : ϕ(si) = ϕ(sj) for some i 6= j} is the union of
n! hyperplanes, and hence its Lebesgue measure is 0, moreover, Ωc = {ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) :
ϕ is injective} is an open and dense subset of B0(Σ). For all ϕ ∈ Ωc, there exist a
unique σ ∈Per(n) s.t. ϕ(sσ(1)) > ϕ(sσ(2)) > · · · > ϕ(sσ(n)) and a number ε > 0 s.t.
ψ(sσ(1)) > ψ(sσ(2)) > · · · > ψ(sσ(n)) for all ψ ∈ U(ϕ, ε) (the ε neighborhood of ϕ in the
uniform metric). Therefore,
lim
ψ→ϕ
I(ψ)− I(ϕ)− P σ(ψ − ϕ)
‖ψ − ϕ‖ = 0
and ∇I(ϕ) = P σ. For any sequence ϕi ∈ Ωc s.t. ϕi → 0, ∇I(ϕi) is a sequence taking (a
finite number of) values in {P σ : σ ∈Per(n)}, hence{
lim
i→∞
∇I(ϕi) : ϕi ∈ Ωc, ϕi → ϕ, and ∇I(ϕi) converges
}
⊆ {P σ : σ ∈ Per(n)}.
Conversely, for each σ ∈Per(n), choose ϕ ∈ B0(Σ) s.t. ϕ(sσ(1)) > ϕ(sσ(2)) > · · · >
ϕ(sσ(n)). Then, the sequence
1
i
ϕ yields{
lim
i→∞
∇I(ϕi) : ϕi ∈ Ωc, ϕi → ϕ, and ∇I(ϕi) converges
}
⊇ {P σ : σ ∈ Per(n)}.
The result now follows from Theorem 49.
B.13 Proof of Proposition 20
(i)⇒ (ii): Let x  y be s.t. xAy is crisp. Then,
(u(x)− u(y))P (A) + u(y) = P (u(xAy)) = Q(u(xAy)) = (u(x)− u(y))Q(A) + u(y)
for all P,Q ∈ C, whence P (A) = Q(A) for all P,Q ∈ C.
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(ii)⇒ (iii): Let x  y. Then,
P (u(xAy)) = (u(x)− u(y))P (A) + u(y) = (u(x)− u(y))Q(A) + u(y) = Q(u(xAy))
for all P,Q ∈ C. That is, xAy is crisp.
(iii)⇒ (i): Obvious.
B.14 Proof of Proposition 21
1) For all P,Q ∈ C, P (S) = 1 = Q(S), hence S ∈ Λ. 2) If A ∈ Λ, for all P,Q ∈ C,
P (Ac) = 1−P (A) = 1−Q(A) = Q(Ac), hence Ac ∈ Λ. 3) If A,B ∈ Λ and A∩B = ∅, for
all P,Q ∈ C, P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B) = Q(A) +Q(B) = Q(A ∪B), hence A ∪B ∈ Λ.
B.15 Proof of Proposition 22
Notice that, for all B ∈ Σ,
min
P∈C
P (Bc) = 1−max
P∈C
P (B) and max
P∈C
P (Bc) = 1−min
P∈C
P (B).
Hence,
ρ (B) = a([B])
(
min
P∈C
P (B)−max
P∈C
P (B)
)
+max
P∈C
P (B)
ρ (Bc) = a([Bc])
(
min
P∈C
P (B)−max
P∈C
P (B)
)
+ 1−min
P∈C
P (B).
It follows that ρ(B)+ρ(Bc) = 1 iff (a([B])+a([Bc])−1) (minP∈C P (B)−maxP∈C P (B)) =
0, as wanted.
B.16 Proof of Proposition 24
(i) ⇒ (ii): Notice that u(X) is an interval. Let a ∈ R. If a ∈ u(X), say a = u(x′),
then {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ a} = {s ∈ S : f(s) < x′} ∈ Λ. Else, either a < t for all
t ∈ u(X), and then {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ a} = S ∈ Λ, or a > t for all t ∈ u(X), and then
{s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ a} = ∅ ∈ Λ.
(ii)⇒ (iii): Let u(f) = Σni=1ai1Ai , with {A1, A2, ..., An} a partition of S in Σ and a1 >
a2 > ... > an. If a /∈ {a1, a2, ..., an}, then {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = a} = ∅ ∈ Λ. The set A1 =
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{s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = a1} = {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ≥ a1} ∈ Λ. For all i ≥ 2, then Λ 3 {s ∈ S :
u(f(s)) ≥ ai} = {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) ∈ {a1, a2, ..., ai}} =
⋃i
j=1 {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = aj} =
A1 ∪ A2 ∪ ... ∪ Ai. Therefore, for all i ≥ 2, {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = ai} = Ai = (A1 ∪ A2 ∪
... ∪ Ai) \ (A1 ∪ A2 ∪ ... ∪ Ai−1) ∈ Λ (remember that if Λ is a λ-system, B,C ∈ Λ, and
C ⊆ B, then B \ C ∈ Λ).
(iii)⇒ (iv): For all x ∈ X, {s ∈ S : f(s) ∼ x} = {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = u(x)} ∈ Λ.
(iv) ⇒ (v): Let u(f) = Σni=1ai1Ai with {A1, A2, ..., An} a partition of S in Σ and
a1 > a2 > ... > an. For all i = 1, 2, ..., n choose si ∈ Ai and set xi = f(si), clearly
u(xi) = u(f(si)) = ai. Therefore:
• for all i = 1, 2, ..., n, Ai = {s ∈ S : u(f(s)) = ai} = {s ∈ S : f(s) ∼ xi} ∈ Λ;
• x1  x2  ...  xn (since a1 > a2 > ... > an);
• if g = {x1, A1;x2, A2; ...;xn, An}, for all s ∈ S, say s ∈ Aj, u(f(s)) = aj = u(xj) =
u(g(s)). That is, f(s) ∼ g(s).
(v) ⇒ (i): Let g = {x1, A1;x2, A2; ...;xn, An}. For all x ∈ X, {s ∈ S : f(s) < x} =
{s ∈ S : g(s) < x} = ⋃ni=1{s ∈ Ai : g(s) < x} = ⋃ni=1{s ∈ Ai : xi < x}. But
for all i = 1, 2, ..., n, {s ∈ Ai : xi < x} either coincides with Ai or is empty. Hence,
{s ∈ S : f(s) < x} is a disjoint union of elements of Λ, which is a λ-system.
B.17 Proof of Proposition 26
A lemma first:
Lemma 53 Let a1, a2, ..., an, b1, b2, ..., bn, c ∈ R be such that
∑n
h=1 ahbσ(h) = c for all
permutations σ ∈ Per(n). Then either a1 = a2 = ... = an or b1 = b2 = ... = bn.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there exist i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ai 6= aj
and k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that bk 6= bl. Consider a permutation σ such that σ(i) = k
and σ(j) = l, and the permutation σ′ = σ(kl) obtained applying σ and then switching
around k and l. It follows that
aibk + ajbl +
∑
h 6=i,j
ahbσ(h) =
n∑
h=1
ahbσ(h) = c =
n∑
h=1
ahbσ′(h) = aibl + ajbk +
∑
h 6=i,j
ahbσ(h),
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whence aibk + ajbl = aibl + ajbk. That is, ai(bk − bl) = aj(bk − bl), which implies ai = aj,
a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 26.
By assumption, we have that for every P,Q ∈ C and each permutation σ ∈ Per(n),
n∑
i=1
[P (Ai)−Q(Ai)]u
(
xσ(i)
)
= 0. (20)
Therefore, either P (A1) − Q(A1) = P (A2) − Q(A2) = · · · = P (An) − Q(An) = b or
u(x1) = u(x2) = ... = u(xn). In the former case 1 =
∑n
i=1 P (Ai) =
∑n
i=1Q(Ai) + nb =
1 + nb. Therefore b = 0 and Ai ∈ Λ for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. It follows that for all x ∈ X,
{s ∈ S : f(s) ∼ x} =
n⋃
i=1
{s ∈ Ai : f(s) ∼ x} =
n⋃
i=1
{s ∈ Ai : xi ∼ x} .
But for all i = 1, 2, ..., n, {s ∈ Ai : xi ∼ x} either coincides with Ai or is empty, so that
{s ∈ S : f(s) ∼ x} is a disjoint union of elements of Λ.
Conversely, suppose that f is unambiguous and xi  xj for every i 6= j in {1, . . . , n}.
Then, for any permutation σ ∈ Per(N) and each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, {s ∈ S : fσ(s) ∼ xσ(i)} =
Ai ∈ Λ. As a consequence, for all P,Q ∈ C,∫
u(fσ) dP =
n∑
i=1
u
(
xσ(i)
)
P (Ai) =
n∑
i=1
u
(
xσ(i)
)
Q(Ai) =
∫
u(fσ) dQ.
B.18 Proof of Proposition 28
As we observed earlier, if y ∈ X, y∪< f iff u(y) = P (u(y)) ≥ P (u(f)) for all P ∈ C
iff u(y) ≥ C(u(f)). Similarly, f∪< y iff C(u(f)) ≥ u(y). Let x∗, x∗ ∈ X be such that
x∗ < f(s) < x∗ for all s ∈ S. Since ∪< is monotonic, x∗∪< f∪< x∗, so that
u(x∗) ≤ C(u(f)) ≤ C(u(f)) ≤ u(x∗).
Hence for all t ∈ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))] there exists xt such that u(xt) = t (recall that u is
affine and X is convex).
If x /∈ N(f), either there exists y ∈ X such that x  y∪< f , or there exists y ∈ X
such that f∪< y  x. That is, either u(x) > u(y) ≥ C(u(f)) or u(x) < u(y) ≤ C(u(f)).
Thus, u(x) /∈ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))].
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Conversely, if u(x) /∈ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))], either u(x) > C(u(f)) or u(x) < C(u(f)).
Take xmax and xmin in X such that u(xmax) = C(u(f)) and u(xmin) = C(u(f)), to obtain
either x  xmax∪< f or f∪< xmin  x. Thus, x /∈ N(f).
We conclude that x ∈ N(f) iff u(x) ∈ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))] or
N(f) = u−1
(
[C(u(f)), C(u(f))]) .
This implies u(N(f)) ⊆ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))]. Conversely, if t ∈ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))], there
exists xt such that u(xt) = t. Clearly, xt ∈ N(f) and t ∈ u(N(f)).
B.19 Proof of Proposition 29
Since the map from B0(Σ) to R defined by
ψ 7→ I(u(f) + ψ)− I(ψ)
is continuous and B0 (Σ) is connected, the set
J = {I(u(f) + ψ)− I(ψ) : ψ ∈ B0(Σ)}
=
{
I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(g)
)
: g ∈ F, λ ∈ (0, 1]
}
is connected. That is, it is an interval. From the lemma, it follows that
J = [C(u(f)), C(u(f))].
Let
M(f) = {x ∈ X : ∃λ ∈ (0, 1], ∃h ∈ F such that xλh ∼ f λ h}.
We have x ∈M(f) iff
u(x) = I
(
u(f) +
1− λ
λ
u(h)
)
− I
(
1− λ
λ
u(h)
)
iff x ∈ u−1(J). Hence, u(M(f)) ⊆ J . Conversely, if t ∈ J , t ∈ [C(u(f)), C(u(f))] and
there exists x ∈ X such that u(x) = t. Clearly, x ∈ M(f), whence u(M(f)) = J . We
conclude observing that
N(f) = u−1
(
[min
P∈C
P (u(f)), max
P∈C
P (u(f))]
)
= u−1
(
J
)
= u−1
(
u(M(f))
)
.
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B.20 Proof of Proposition 31
To prove the statement for <↓ (that for <↑ is proved analogously), we only need to show
that
f <↓ g ⇐⇒ C(u(f)) ≥ C(u(g)).
Applying the definition of <↓ and Proposition 4, we have that f <↓ g iff for every x ∈ X,
P (u(g)) ≥ u(x) for all P ∈ C ⇒ P (u(f)) ≥ u(x) for all P ∈ C.
That is, iff for every x ∈ X,
C(u(g)) ≥ u(x)⇒ C(u(f)) ≥ u(x).
This is equivalent to C(u(f)) ≥ C(u(g)), concluding the proof.
B.21 Proof of Proposition 32
(i) ⇔ (ii): We have proved in Proposition 31 that <↓ is represented by the functional
C(u(·)), and <↑ by C(u(·)). Consider < and <↓, and recall Prop. 7. It is clear that
C(u(f)) ≤ I(u(f)) is tantamount to saying that for every x ∈ X,
x < f ⇒ x <↓ f.
The argument for < and <↑ is analogous.
(ii)⇔ (iii): This follows immediately from Lemmas 48 and 52.
B.22 Proof of Theorem 33
The proof of the theorem builds on the following lemma.
Lemma 54 Let I : B0(Σ) → R be a monotonic constant linear functional, and D a set
of probabilities such that
min
P∈D
P (ψ) ≤ I(ψ) ≤ max
P∈D
P (ψ)
for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ). If I(ψ) = T (minP∈D P (ψ),maxP∈D P (ψ)) for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ), then
there exists β ∈ [0, 1] such that
I(ψ) = βmin
P∈D
P (ψ) + (1− β)max
P∈D
P (ψ)
for all ψ ∈ B0(Σ). If D is not a singleton, β is unique.
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Proof. If D is a singleton the result is trivial, so assume it is not. Since D is such that
min
P∈D
P (ψ) ≤ I(ψ) ≤ max
P∈D
P (ψ)
for all ψ ∈ B (Σ), for all ϕ such that minP∈D P (ϕ) < maxP∈D P (ϕ) there exists a unique
β (ϕ) ∈ [0, 1] for which
I(ϕ) = β (ϕ)min
P∈D
P (ϕ) + (1− β (ϕ))max
P∈D
P (ϕ) ,
a little algebra yields:
β (ϕ) =
I (ϕ)−maxP∈D P (ϕ)
minP∈D P (ϕ)−maxP∈D P (ϕ) =
= − I (ϕ)−maxP∈D P (ϕ)
maxP∈D P (ϕ)−minP∈D P (ϕ) = −I
(
ϕ−maxP∈D P (ϕ)
maxP∈D P (ϕ)−minP∈D P (ϕ)
)
.
But, I (ψ) = T (minP∈D P (ψ) ,maxP∈D P (ψ)) for all ψ ∈ B (Σ). Moreover,
max
P∈D
(
ϕ−maxP∈D P (ϕ)
maxP∈D P (ϕ)−minP∈D P (ϕ)
)
= 0 and
min
P∈D
(
ϕ−maxP∈D P (ϕ)
maxP∈D P (ϕ)−minP∈D P (ϕ)
)
= −1;
therefore,
β (ϕ) = −I
(
ϕ−maxP∈D P (ϕ)
maxP∈D P (ϕ)−minP∈D P (ϕ)
)
= −T (−1, 0) .
That is β (ϕ) ≡ β does not depend on ϕ. 
Proof of Theorem 33. It is enough to show that, for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ), I(ϕ) depends only
on minP∈C P (ϕ) and maxP∈C P (ϕ). For, then we can set T (minP∈C P (ϕ),maxP∈C P (ϕ)) =
I(ϕ) and apply Lemma 54.
Let ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ) be such that
min
P∈C
P (ϕ) = min
P∈C
P (ψ) and max
P∈C
P (ϕ) = max
P∈C
P (ψ).
Take α > 0 s.t. αϕ, αψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)) and f, g ∈ F s.t. u(f) = αϕ and u(g) = αψ.
Clearly,
min
P∈C
P (u (f)) = min
P∈C
P (u (g)) and max
P∈C
P (u (f)) = max
P∈C
P (u (g)),
then
N(f) = u−1
([C(u(f)), C(u(f))]) = u−1 ([C(u(g)), C(u(g))]) = N(g)
and Axiom 6 yields f ∼ g, so that I(αϕ) = I(u(f)) = I(u(g)) = I(αψ). The converse is
trivial.
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B.23 Proof of Proposition 36
The uniqueness of I descending from Lemma 1 guarantees that
I(ϕ) = βmin
Q∈D
Q(ϕ) + (1− β)max
Q∈D
Q(ϕ)
for all ϕ ∈ B0(Σ). Then, by points 6 and 7 of Proposition 45 it follows that
C = ∂I(0)
= ∂(βmin
Q∈D
Q(·) + (1− β)max
Q∈D
Q(·))(0)
⊆ β ∂(min
Q∈D
Q(·))(0) + (1− β) ∂(max
Q∈D
Q(·))(0)
= βD + (1− β)D.
If, moreover, < satisfies axiom 6, then
I(ϕ) = αmin
P∈C
P (ϕ) + (1− α)max
P∈C
P (ϕ).
That is,
βmin
Q∈D
Q(·) + (1− β)max
Q∈D
Q(·) = αmin
P∈C
P (ϕ) + (1− α)max
P∈C
P (ϕ).
If C = D, then clearly α = β, and we are done. So suppose that C ⊂ D. Let ϕ be s.t.
c = minP∈C P (ϕ) < maxP∈C P (ϕ) = c. A fortiori, d = minQ∈DQ(ϕ) < maxQ∈DQ(ϕ) =
d. Moreover,
1
2
c+
1
2
c =
1
2
I(ϕ)− 1
2
I(−ϕ) = 1
2
d+
1
2
d.
Let c = 1
2
c+ 1
2
c to obtain
I(ϕ) = αc+ (1− α)c
= c+ αc+ (1− α)c− 1
2
c− 1
2
c
= c+
(
1
2
− α
)
(c− c)
and, analogously,
I(ϕ) = c+
(
1
2
− β
)
(d− d).
Therefore, (
1
2
− β
)
(d− d) =
(
1
2
− α
)
(c− c).
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If β > 1/2, then α > 1/2 and(
1
2
− β
)
(d− d) =
(
1
2
− α
)
(c− c) >
(
1
2
− α
)
(d− d)
yields α > β. Analogously, if β < 1/2, then α < 1/2 and(
1
2
− β
)
(d− d) =
(
1
2
− α
)
(c− c) <
(
1
2
− α
)
(d− d)
yields α < β.
B.24 Proof of Lemma 38
(i)⇔ (ii): Assume that, for every A ∈ Π, f ∼A f A g for every f, g ∈ F, hence, for every
h ∈ F [λf + (1 − λ)h] ∼A [λf + (1 − λ)h]A[λg + (1 − λ)h], that is λf + (1 − λ)h ∼A
λfAg+ (1− λ)h, thus f∪∼ A f A g. Conversely, if f∪∼ A f A g for every f, g ∈ F, then in
particular f ∼A f A g for every f, g ∈ F.
(ii) ⇔ (iii): By Proposition 4, f∪∼A fAg iff P (uA(f)) = P (uA(fAg)) for all P ∈
CA. It immediately follows that CA(uA(f)) = CA(uA(fAg)). By Proposition 31, this is
equivalent to f ∼↓A fAg.
Conversely, suppose that f ∼↓A fAg for every f, g ∈ F. Consider x A y. Since
x ∼↓A xAy, it follows from Proposition 31 that
uA(x) = min
P∈CA
[uA(x)P (A) + uA(y) (1− P (A))]
= uA(x) min
P∈CA
P (A) + uA(y) (1− min
P∈CA
P (A)).
Since uA(x) > uA(Y ), this implies that minP∈CA P (A) = 1, or equivalently, that P (A) = 1
for all P ∈ CA. It follows that P (uA(f)) = P (uA(fAg)) for all P ∈ CA, which is equivalent
to f∪∼A fAg.
B.25 Proof of Proposition 39
First, we observe that the fact that Eq. (10) implies CA = C|A is a consequence of
Proposition 41. That it implies uA = u is seen by taking f = x and g = x
′ to show that
x <A x′ ⇔ x < x′. The converse is trivial.
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(i) ⇔ (ii): fAg∪< g for all P ∈ C iff ∫A u(f) dP + ∫Ac u(g) dP ≥ ∫A u(g) dP +∫
Ac
u(g) dP for all P ∈ C iff ∫
A
u(f) dP ≥ ∫
A
u(g) dP for all P ∈ C iff PA(u(f)) ≥ PA(u(g))
for all P ∈ C.
(i)⇒ (iii): Suppose that u = uA. We first observe that it follows from Proposition 28
that for every f ∈ F and x ∈ X, with obvious notation,
x ∈ NA(f)⇐⇒ CA(u(f)) ≤ u(x) ≤ CA(u(f)). (21)
Next, we prove that for every f ∈ F and x ∈ X, again with obvious notation,
x ∈ N(f Ax)⇐⇒ C|A(u(f)) ≤ u(x) ≤ C|A(u(f)). (22)
To see this, apply again Proposition 28 to find
x ∈ N(f Ax)⇐⇒ C(u(f Ax)) ≤ u(x) ≤ C(u(f Ax)).
That is, x ∈ N(fAx) iff both
min
P∈C
∫
S
u(f Ax) dP ≤ u(x) (23)
and
u(x) ≤ max
P∈C
∫
S
u(f Ax) dP. (24)
Denote resp. P and P the probabilities in C that attain the extrema in Eqs. (23) and
(24). Then we can rewrite Eq. (23) as follows:
u(x) ≥ 1
P (A)
∫
A
u(f) dP ,
which is equivalent to saying that
u(x) ≥ min
P∈C
∫
S
u(f) dPA = C|A(u(f)).
Analogously, Eq. (24) can be rewritten as
u(x) ≤ 1
P (A)
∫
A
u(f) dP ,
which is equivalent to
u(x) ≤ max
P∈C
∫
S
u(f) dPA = C|A(u(f)).
This ends the proof of Eq. (22).
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To prove (i), notice that x < x′ ⇒ x <A x′ obviously follows from the assumption
u = uA, and that, given Eqs. (21) and (22), Eq. (12) follows immediately from the
assumption C|A = CA.
(iii) ⇒ (i): First, observe that the assumption that x < x′ ⇒ x <A x′ implies
u = uA by Corollary 51. Hence, it follows from Eqs. (21) and (22) above that Eq. (12) is
equivalent to
CA(u(f)) ≤ u(x) ≤ CA(u(f))⇐⇒ C|A(u(f)) ≤ u(x) ≤ C|A(u(f)).
In particular, this implies that for every ϕ ∈ B0(Σ, u(X)),
min
P∈C|A
P (ϕ) = min
Q∈CA
Q(ϕ) (25)
The result that C|A = CA now follows from two applications of Proposition 41.
(i)⇒ (iv): By Proposition 31 and the assumption that uA = u, for every f ∈ F and
x ∈ X we have that f <↓A x iff Q(u(f)) ≥ u(x) for all Q ∈ CA. Next, we show that
f Ax <↓ x⇐⇒ P (u(f)) ≥ u(x) for all P ∈ C|A, (26)
so that the result follows from the assumption that C|A = CA.
To see why Eq. (26) holds, notice that by Prop. 31, fAx <↓ x iff P (u(fAx)) ≥ u(x)
for all P ∈ C. Equivalently, for every P ∈ C,∫
A
u(f) dP + (1− P (A))u(x) ≥ u(x),
which holds iff PA(u(f)) ≥ u(x) (recall that P (A) > 0 for all P ∈ C). In turn, the latter
is equivalent to saying that P (u(f)) ≥ u(x) for every P ∈ C|A.
(iv) ⇒ (i): We first show (mimicking an argument of Siniscalchi [28]) that Eq. (13)
implies that uA = u. To see this, notice that we have uA(x) ≥ uA(x′) iff x <A x′ iff
xAx′ <↓ x′ iff
min
P∈C
[u(x)P (A) + u(x′)(1− P (A))] ≥ u(x′).
Using the assumption that minP∈C P (A) > 0, the latter is equivalent to u(x) ≥ u(x′),
proving that uA = u.
We now show that C|A = CA by showing that Eq. (25) holds for every ϕ ∈ B0(Σ, u(X)),
so that the result follows again from Lemma 41. As argued above, Eq. (13) holds for f
and x iff
P (u(f)) ≥ u(x) for all P ∈ C|A⇐⇒ Q(u(f)) ≥ u(x) for all Q ∈ CA.
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Fix ϕ ∈ B0(Σ, u(X)) and suppose that, in violation of Eq. (25), α ≡ minP∈C|A P (ϕ) >
minQ∈CA Q(ϕ) ≡ β. Then there exists γ ∈ (β, α). Let x denote the consequence such
that u(x) = γ. By the assumption we just made, we have that (if f ∈ F is such that
u(f) = ϕ),
min
P∈C|A
P (u(f)) > u(x) and u(x) > min
Q∈CA
Q(u(f)),
which, as proved above (the proof for strict preference works mutatis mutandis as that
for weak preference, recalling that C|A is weak∗ compact), is equivalent to fAx ↓ x and
f ≺↓A x, a contradiction. Suppose instead that α < β and let γ ∈ (α, β). In this case we
obtain
min
P∈C|A
P (u(f)) < u(x) and u(x) < min
Q∈CA
Q(u(f)),
which is equivalent to f ↓A x and x ↓ fAx (to see the latter, let P ∗ ∈ C be the probabil-
ity whose posterior minimizes the left-hand inequality; it follows that minP∈C P (u(fAx)) ≤
P ∗(u(fAx)) < u(x)), again a contradiction. This concludes the proof of Eq. (25).
Appendix C The Extension to Infinite Acts
We now briefly discuss how the analysis in the first part of the paper (Sections 2–4)
extends to the case in which the choice set that the DM faces contains acts which are not
finite-valued. Here, we start by assuming that< is a weak order on F, and we let F′ denote
the set of all the Σ-measurable and preference-bounded functions from S into X.
That is, f ∈ F′ if: {s ∈ S : f(s) < x} ∈ Σ and {s ∈ S : f(s)  x} ∈ Σ} for every x ∈ X
and there exist x, y ∈ X such that x < f(s) < y for all s ∈ S. Following the example of
Gilboa and Schmeidler [16], we then show that if < satisfies axioms 1–5 (as stated), it has
a unique extension <′ that also satisfies axioms 1–5 (with F substituted with F′). That
is, the DM’s preference on simple acts determine his preferences on preference-bounded
acts. Moreover, such extended preference is represented by the utility function u and a
functional I ′ : F′ → R that is monotonic and constant linear.
As recalled earlier, ba(Σ), endowed with the total variation norm, is isometrically
isomorphic to the norm dual of B(Σ). Since B0(Σ) is dense in B(Σ), ba(Σ) is also
isometrically isomorphic to the norm dual of B0(Σ). Moreover, for bounded subsets of
ba(Σ) the σ(ba(Σ), B(Σ)) and the σ(ba(Σ), B0(Σ)) topologies coincide (for a proof of this
result, see Maccheroni and Marinacci [20]):
Lemma 55 Let µa be a bounded net in ba(Σ), where Σ is a field of subsets of S. The
following facts are equivalent:
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(i) The net µa converges to µ in the σ(ba(Σ), B(Σ)) topology,
(ii) The net µa converges to µ in the σ(ba(Σ), B0(Σ)) topology,
(iii) lim
a
µa(A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ Σ.
In view of this result, we refer to either one of σ(ba(Σ), B(Σ)) and σ(ba(Σ), B0(Σ)) as
“the weak* topology”.
We now show that a monotonic constant linear functional defined on B0(Σ) (as the
I obtained in Lemma 1) has a unique monotonic constant linear extension to B(Σ).
Definition 56 Let I : B0(Σ) → R be a monotonic constant linear functional. The
functional I∗ : B → R defined by
I∗ (ξ) = sup {I (ϕ) : ϕ ∈ B0 (Σ) , ϕ ≤ ξ}
is called the lower extension of I. The functional I∗ : B → R defined by
I∗ (ξ) = inf {I (ϕ) : ϕ ∈ B0 (Σ) , ϕ ≥ ξ}
is called the upper extension of I. Finally, ξ is said to be I-exhaustible if
I∗ (ξ) = I∗ (ξ) .
Remark 1 Let I : B0(Σ) → R be a monotonic constant linear functional, ξ ∈ B(S).
Then:
1. −∞ < I∗(ξ) ≤ I∗(ξ) <∞;
2. If ξ ∈ B0(Σ), ξ is I-exhaustible, and I(ξ) = I∗(ξ) = I∗(ξ).
Hence, if ξ is I-exhaustible, we can set I(ξ) = I∗(ξ). The set of I-exhaustible functions
is denoted by B(I).
Proposition 57 Let I : B0(Σ) → R be a monotonic constant linear functional, ξ ∈
B(S). The following facts are equivalent:
(i) ξ ∈ B(I).
(ii) For all ε > 0, there exist ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ) such that ϕ ≤ ξ ≤ ψ and I(ψ)− I(ϕ) ≤ ε.
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(iii) There exist {ϕn}, {ψn} ⊆ B0(Σ) such that ϕn ≤ ϕn+1 ≤ ξ ≤ ψn+1 ≤ ψn and
I(ψn)− I(ϕn) ↓ 0.
In this case, I(ξ) = lim
n→∞
I(ψn) = lim
n→∞
I(ϕn).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (iii): I(ξ) = sup{I(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ B0(Σ), ϕ ≤ ξ}. Therefore, there exist
{ϕ̂n} ⊆ B0(Σ) such that ϕ̂n ≤ ξ for all n ∈ N, and lim
n→∞
I(ϕ̂n) = I(ξ).
Let ϕn = max{ϕ̂1, ϕ̂2, ..., ϕ̂n} for all n ∈ N, {ϕn} ⊆ B0(Σ), and ϕ̂n ≤ ϕn ≤ ϕn+1 ≤ ξ
for all n ∈ N. I(ϕ̂n) ≤ I(ϕn) ≤ I(ϕn+1) ≤ I(ξ) for all n ∈ N, thus I(ϕn) ↑ I(ξ).
Similarly, we can build {ψn} ⊆ B0(Σ) such that ξ ≤ ψn+1 ≤ ψn and I(ψn) ↓ I(ξ).
(iii)⇒ (ii): Trivial.
(ii) ⇒ (i): For all ε > 0, there exist ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ) such that ϕ ≤ ξ ≤ ψ and
I(ψ) ≤ I(ϕ)+ε. Then, I(ϕ) ≤ I∗(ξ) ≤ I∗(ξ) ≤ I(ψ) ≤ I(ϕ)+ε , so 0 ≤ I∗(ξ)−I∗(ξ) ≤ ε.

Proposition 58 For any monotonic constant linear functional I on B0(Σ), B(I) is a
cone, it is closed w.r.t. addition of constant functions, and the functional I : B(I)→ R
is constant linear, monotone and continuous.
Proof. See Maccheroni and Marinacci [20] . 
Theorem 59 Let I : B0(Σ) → R be a monotonic constant linear functional, ξ ∈ B(S).
Then, ξ ∈ B(Σ) if and only if ξ is I-exhaustible.
Proof. Let I : B0(Σ) → R be a monotonic constant linear functional and ξ ∈ B(Σ).
There exist {ϕn} ⊆ B0(Σ) and {δn} ⊆ R+ such that δn → 0 and ϕn−δn ≤ ξ ≤ ϕn+δn for
all n ∈ N. For all ε > 0, there exist nε such that 2δnε ≤ ε. The functions ϕnε− δnε , ϕnε+
δnε ∈ B0(Σ) satisfy ϕnε− δnε ≤ ξ ≤ ϕnε+ δnε and I(ϕnε+dnε)− I(ϕnε− δnε) = 2δnε ≤ ε.
So, by Proposition 57, ξ is I-exhaustible. For a proof of the converse, see Maccheroni
and Marinacci [20]. 
We therefore obtain the sought result:
Corollary 60 If I is a monotonic constant linear functional I on B0(Σ), then there
exists a unique monotonic constant linear extension of I to B(Σ).
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To extend the representation obtained in Lemma 1 to the preference-bounded acts
in F′, we first notice that B(Σ) is the set of utility images of acts in F′ and consider
a preference relation < whose restriction to F satisfies axioms 1–5. Hence, it can be
represented by a monotonic constant linear functional I on B0(Σ). By Corollary 60, I
has a unique monotonic constant linear extension I ′ to B(Σ). Let <′ on F′ be defined as
follows:
f <′ g ⇐⇒ I ′(u(f)) ≥ I ′(u(g)).
It follows that <′ is an extension of < to F′ that satisfies axioms 1–5 (in which every
instance of F is substituted with F′), and it is uniquely defined.
Having thus extended the representation of Lemma 1, we may wonder whether the
other results proved in sections 2–4 generalize to the case in which acts belong to F′. The
simple answer is “yes”, for it is straightforward to check that the results in Appendix A
hold with B(Σ, K) (resp. I ′) substituting B0(Σ, K) (resp. I). Therefore, we can adapt
the proofs in Appendix B to show that the results in the main text can be extended to
this case.
More interestingly, we also find that this generalization does not affect our represen-
tation of the DM’s ambiguity perception. This occurs for three main reasons.
First, suppose that given the “extended” preference relation <′, we define the “ex-
tended” unambiguous preference relation ∪<′ . It is immediate to use the continuity of
the functional I ′ (which follows from the fact that I ′ is Lipschitz) to verify that for all
f, g ∈ F,
f∪< g ⇐⇒ f∪<′ g.
That is, the extended unambiguous preference is a proper extension of the “narrow”
unambiguous preference. Consider now this immediate corollary of Proposition 42:
Corollary 61 If & is a nontrivial, continuous, conic, and monotonic preorder on B0(Σ, K)
represented by a nonempty weak* closed and convex subset C of pc(Σ), then there exists a
unique nontrivial, continuous, conic, and monotonic preorder &′ on B(Σ) such that for
all ϕ, ψ ∈ B0(Σ, K)
ϕ & ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ &′ ψ,
and &′ is represented by C.
It follows that the set C represents also ∪<′ : For all f, g ∈ F′,
f∪<′ g ⇐⇒
∫
S
u(f) dP ≥
∫
S
u(g) dP for all P ∈ C. (27)
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Second, notice that if we define the “extended” mixture certainty equivalents set
N ′(f), forf ∈ F′ we find, again by the continuity of I ′, that N ′(f) is the preference
closure of the set
{x ∈ X : ∃λ ∈ (0, 1], ∃h ∈ F such that xλh ∼ f λ h}.
That is, simple acts suffice in finding the mixture certainty equivalents of f . Third, it is
analogously sufficient to use simple acts in deciding whether f ∈ F′ is crisp. Thus the
set of “extended” crisp acts [x]′ contains the “narrow” [x].
Thus, we conclude that not only can the previous results be equivalently stated with
F′, <′, I ′, ∪<′ , N ′ and [x]′ in place of their unprimed counterparts. We also have that
every conclusion that can be drawn by restricting our attention to simple acts remains
valid in this extended problem. In particular, Eq. (27) implies that the set C obtained
from ∪< provides us with a complete description of his perception of ambiguity, so that
∂I(0) = ∂I ′(0).
74
References
[1] Frank J. Anscombe and Robert J. Aumann. A definition of subjective probability.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34:199–205, 1963.
[2] Kenneth J. Arrow and Leonid Hurwicz. An optimality criterion for decision making
under ignorance. In C.F. Carter and J.L. Ford, editors, Uncertainty and Expectations
in Economics. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972.
[3] Truman Bewley. Knightian decision theory: Part I. Technical Report 807, Cowles
Foundation, Yale University, 1986.
[4] G. Carlier and Rose-Anne Dana. Core of convex distortions of a probability on a
nonatomic space. Mimeo, CEREMADE, U. Paris Dauphine, July 2001.
[5] Frank H. Clarke. Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis. J. Wiley, New York, 1983.
[6] Daniel Ellsberg. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 75:643–669, 1961.
[7] Larry G. Epstein and Martin Schneider. Recursive multiple-priors. Mimeo, Univer-
sity of Rochester and UCLA, August 2001.
[8] Larry G. Epstein and Tan Wang. Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian un-
certainty. Econometrica, 62:283–322, 1994.
[9] Larry G. Epstein and Jiankang Zhang. Subjective probabilities on subjectively un-
ambiguous events. Econometrica, 69:265–306, March 2001.
[10] Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky. Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110:585–603, August 1995.
[11] Paolo Ghirardato. Revisiting Savage in a conditional world. Economic Theory,
20:83–92, March 2002.
[12] Paolo Ghirardato and Jonathan N. Katz. Indecision theory: Explaining selective ab-
stention in multiple elections. Social Science Working Paper 1106, Caltech, Novem-
ber 2000. http://www.hss.caltech.edu/∼paolo/voting.pdf.
[13] Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and Marciano Siniscalchi.
A subjective spin on roulette wheels. Social Science Working Paper 1127, Caltech,
August 2001. http://www.hss.caltech.edu/∼paolo/invariant.pdf.
75
[14] Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci. Risk, ambiguity, and the separation
of utility and beliefs. Mathematics of Operations Research, 26:864–890, November
2001.
[15] Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci. Ambiguity made precise: A comparative
foundation. Journal of Economic Theory, 102:251–289, February 2002.
[16] Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler. Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique
prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18:141–153, 1989.
[17] Chip Heath and Amos Tversky. Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence
in choice under uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4:5–28, 1991.
[18] Igor Kopylov. Procedural rationality in the multiple priors model. Mimeo, University
of Rochester, April 2001.
[19] R. Duncan Luce. Utility of Gains and Losses: Measurement-Theoretical and Exper-
imental Approaches. Lawrence Erlbaum, London, 2000.
[20] Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci. Notes on the theory of capacities. Un-
published lecture notes, Universita` Bocconi and Universita` di Torino, November
1999.
[21] Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio. A characterization of the core of convex
games through Gateaux derivatives. Mimeo, Universita` di Torino, April 2002.
[22] Klaus Nehring. Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: A precarious coexistence. Math-
emathical Social Sciences, 38:197–213, 1999.
[23] Klaus Nehring. Ambiguity in the context of probabilistic beliefs. Mimeo, UC Davis,
November 2001.
[24] Kiyohiko G. Nishimura and Hiroyuki Ozaki. Search and Knightian uncertainty.
Mimeo, University of Tokyo and Tohoku University, April 2001.
[25] R. Tyrrell Rockafellar. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1970.
[26] David Schmeidler. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity.
Econometrica, 57:571–587, 1989.
[27] Lloyd S. Shapley. Cores of convex games. International Journal of Game Theory,
1:11–26, 1971.
76
[28] Marciano Siniscalchi. Bayesian updating for general maxmin expected utility pref-
erences. Mimeo, Princeton University, September 2001.
[29] Marciano Siniscalchi. A vector-valued representation of preferences under uncer-
tainty. Mimeo, Princeton University, March 2002.
[30] Jiankang Zhang. Subjective ambiguity, probability and capacity. Economic Theory,
20:159–181, March 2002.
77
